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The mandatory Polar Code is now set into force with strengthened requirements for vessels 
operating in polar waters. The polar cruise shipping segment is growing as the maritime 
activity in polar waters is increasing. There are many challenges, and the polar environment 
adds an increased risk level. The preventive actions towards mitigating risks are more 
important due to the harsh environment, long distances and limited options for assistant 
rescue. 
Most accidents and incidents have pre-occurring causes which are not captured until an 
unwanted event occurs, or not at all if the unwanted event is minor or less severe. A proper 
reporting regime is essential to identify these causes, and this is done through safety 
management with all its implications, as well as encouraging a healthy safety culture.  
Relevant theory is reviewed, and terms and maritime safety challenges are explained to 
provide the basis for the discussion in this thesis. Further basis is provided through a survey 
directed towards polar cruise operators and a root cause analysis of a polar cruise vessel 
grounding in the Canadian Arctic utilizing reliability engineering methods.  
Related to the work with the thesis, I participated in the Fourth Joint Arctic SAR TTX in 
Reykjavik this April. Highlights from the event are included in Appendix C and provide 
actualization of the research theme: How the polar cruise shipping segment is implementing 
the Polar Code. 
The results of the survey and the root cause analysis are discussed related to the maritime 
safety challenges, and the thesis aims to provide knowledge about the implementation of the 
Polar Code in the polar cruise shipping segment, and to identify challenges related to this 
process. 
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ACGF  Arctic Coast Guard Forum 
AECO Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators 
AHP  Analytical Hierarchy Process 
AIRSS Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System 
ARCSAR Arctic and North-Atlantic Security and Emergency Preparedness Network 
ARIF  Arctic Risk Influencing Factors 
BRM  Bridge Resource Management 
COLREGs Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
CCGS  Canadian Coast Guard Ship 
ECS  Electronic Chart System 
ECDIS Electronic Chart Display and Information System 
EGC  Enhanced Group Call 
EPPR  Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response 
FLS  Forward Looking Sonar 
FMECA Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis 
FSA  Formal Safety Assessment 
FTA  Fault Tree Analysis 
GMDSS Global Maritime Distress and Safety System 
GNSS  Global Navigation Satellite System 
GPS  Global Positioning System (USA) 
HIFR  Helicopter In-Flight Refuelling 
HSEQ  Health, Safety, Environment & Quality 
IAATO International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators 
IBNS  Integrated Bridge Navigation System 
ICG  Icelandic Coast Guard 
IHO  International Hydrographic Organization 
ILLC  International Convention on Load Lines 
IMCS  Integrated Machinery Control System 
IMO  International Maritime Organization 
ISM  International Safety Management 




LSA  Life-Saving Appliances 
MCTS Maritime Communication Traffic Service 
MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
MSC  Maritime Safety Committee 
NAVTEX Navigational Telex 
NAVWARN Navigational Warning 
NCA  Norwegian Coastal Administration 
NMA  Norwegian Maritime Authority 
NORDREG Canadian Arctic Marine Traffic System 
NOTSHIP Notice to Shipping (Former Canadian NAVWARN) 
NSRA  Northern Sea Route Administration 
POLARIS Polar Operational Limit Assessment Risk Indexing System 
PSC  Polar Ship Certificate 
PWOM Polar Water Operations Manual 
RBD  Reliability Block Diagram 
RIO  Risk Index Outcome 
RPN  Risk Priority Number 
SAR  Search and Rescue 
SARC  Arctic Maritime Safety Cooperation 
SAREX Search and Rescue Exercise 
SMS  Safety Management System 
SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
SOP  Standard Operating Procedure 
STCW International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
TSB Transportation Safety Board of Canada 
TTX Table Top Exercise 







The following definitions are used in this thesis 
 
AIRSS Canadian regulatory standard intended to minimize the risk of pollution 
in Arctic waters due to damage of vessels by ice; to emphasize the 
responsibility of the shipowner and master for safety; and to provide a 
flexible framework for decision-making.  
 
Contributing Failures related to regulations, organization, procedures or design.  
Factors  
 
Basic/Advanced Requirement in the Polar Code. Masters, chief mates and officers in 
Polar Code Course charge of a navigational watch on board ships operating in polar waters 
shall have completed training to attain the abilities that are appropriate 
to the capacity to be filled, and duties and responsibilities to be taken 
up. 
 
FMECA A straight forward step-by-step technique to systematically determining 
the ways in which a failure can occur, and the effects that each failure 
can have on overall functionality of a system. (Labib and Read, 2015) 
 
GNSS A satellite navigation system with global coverage. The United States’ 
GPS and Russia’s GLONASS are fully operational GNSSs, while the 
EU’s GALILEO and China’s BDS are expected to be fully operational 
by the early 2020s. 
 
Hazards Possible events and conditions that may result in severity, i.e. cause 
significant harm. (Kristiansen, 2005) 
 
Human Error An incorrect decision, an improperly performed action or an improper 
lack of action. (Rothblum et.al, 2002) 
 
Ice Regime A description of an area with a relatively consistent distribution of any 
mix of ice types, including open water. (IMO) 
 
ISM Code  The objective of the ISM Code is to ensure safety at sea, prevention of 
human injury or loss of life, and avoidance of damage to the 
environment, in particular the marine environment, and to property. 
(IMO) 
 
LSA Code The purpose of the LSA Code is to provide international standards for 
life-saving appliances required by the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). Examples of life-saving appliances are 
lifeboats, life-rafts, lifebuoys, lifejackets, immersion suits, thermal 





NAVWARN Navigational information concerning navigational safety. Can be 
obtained through numerous methods including Inmarsat-C, SafetyNet, 
Navigational Area (NAVAREA) broadcasts, HF broadcasts, the 
relevant authority website and by contacting maritime communication 
traffic services. 
 
NSRA Russian federal state institution aimed to ensure safe navigation and 
protection of marine environment from the pollution in the water area 
of the Northern sea route. 
 
NORDREG Canadian Arctic marine traffic system created pursuant to the Northern 
 Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations. The system is 
designed to ensure that the most effective services are available to 
accommodate current and future levels of marine traffic. 
 
Polar Code  The goal of the Polar Code is to provide for safe ship operation and the 
protection of the polar environment by addressing risks present in polar 
waters and not adequately mitigated by other instruments of the 
Organization. (IMO) 
 
POLARIS A decision support system that can be used for voyage planning and on 
the ship’s bridge. It uses the ship’s actual ice class and the actual ice 
conditions encountered to determine a risk index outcome (RIO) – 
effectively, a way of assigning a level of risk to ice operations for ships 
with certain ice classes. (Lloyd’s) 
 
Reliability The ability of a system or component to perform certain defined 
functions. (Kristiansen, 2005) 
 
Risk An evaluation of hazards in terms of severity and probability. 
(Kristiansen, 2005) 
 
Root Causes Pre-occurring causes which contribute to an event. 
 
Safety The degree of freedom from danger and harm. Safety is achieved by 
doing things right the first time and every time. (Kristiansen, 2005) 
 
Safety Keeping an operation safe through systematic and safety-minded 
Management organization and management of both human and physical resources. 
(Kristiansen, 2005) 
 
Shoulder Season In the polar cruise shipping segment, the periods between ice-covered 








Winterization Ensuring a vessel is suitably prepared for operations in freezing 
temperatures. It focuses on controlling the adverse effects of icing, 
freezing, wind chill and material properties in cold temperatures. 
Effective winterization includes structural design to reduce icing and 
cold exposure; heating, insulation and drainage; mechanical de-icing; 
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The polar cruise shipping segment, including large cruise ships as well as small- and mid-size 
cruise and explorer ships, is continuing to grow. Many cruise companies offer cruises to polar 
destinations, and in 2019 more than 500 000 passengers are expected to call at the 12 ports 
that are members of Cruise Northern Norway and Svalbard (CNNS, 2019). Judging by the 
orderbook of Norwegian shipyards (NSF 2018, Norsk Industri 2018) there has been an 
increase in orders for cruise ships with length over 40 meters since 2015, shown in yellow in 
figure 1. Furthermore, the Cruise Ship Orderbook (CIN, 2019) show that there are over 40 
planned small to medium sized expedition ships over the next 5 years, many of which have 
high ice-class. No doubt, the remoteness and characteristics of the polar areas make them 
exotic travel destinations and the accessibility to these destinations is improving due to ice 
melting. The tendency further shows that a larger part of the shoulder season is utilized, and 
some operators are also offering winter cruises.  
 
Figure 1: Orderbook for Norwegian Shipyards (Norsk Industri, 2018) 
There are several challenges to consider when operating in polar waters. The previously 
mentioned accessibility is followed by the lack of, or poor, hydrographic data in both the 
newly ice-free areas and a generally large part of the waters in the polar areas. The maritime 
and communication infrastructure is limited. The remoteness and extreme met-ocean 
conditions are factors of concern for the officers on board the ship as well as stakeholders and 
search and rescue (SAR) entities. 
 
2 
International standards and regulations adopted by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) contribute to the mitigation of the risks involved with ship operations worldwide. 
Today’s maritime safety regime is a result of several major accidents in shipping where 
human errors and management faults have been identified as the main causes. The 
International Safety Management (ISM) Code introduces an enforced self-regulatory 
mechanism where the shipping companies themselves are to regulate their own activities 
(Batalden, 2015). This is achieved through a safety management system (SMS). In 2017, 
more specific standards were made mandatory for ships operating in polar waters, introducing 
the Polar Code. The Polar Code contains strengthened requirements for the ship and its crew 
and acknowledges the extra sensitive environment and conditions in the Arctic and the 
Antarctic compared to other areas. The new standards include important improvements such 
as new systems and equipment on board the ship, new requirements to life-saving appliances 
(LSAs), new criteria for the design and construction of ships as well as risk assessments, 
procedures, manuals and additional officer training (IMO, 2016). 
Several projects have investigated, and are still investigating, the challenges related to 
increased activity in the polar areas. Many of these projects are related to each other. Main 
examples to include are the SAR exercises SARex Spitzbergen (Solberg et.al, 2016), SARex 
2 (Solberg et.al, 2017) and SARex 3 (Solberg and Gudmestad, 2018). The SARex project is 
closely related to the implementation of the Polar Code, as it aims to investigate some of the 
functional requirements that are introduced. Other projects are the SARiNOR project 
(SARINOR, 2018) which focuses on the general SAR challenges in the Arctic as well as 
preparedness related to the environment and pollution, and the ongoing SARex Svalbard 
project (Rederiforbundet, 2019) which involves full scale exercises in a polar environment. 
The SARex Svalbard project is a follow-up project from both the SARiNOR project and the 
SARex project and involves many of the same participants. Also ongoing is the ARCSAR 
(Arctic and North Atlantic Security and Emergency Preparedness Network) project, where the 
main goal is to establish a network of government, organizational and front-line stakeholders 
to meet the challenges following the increased activity in the Arctic (ARCSAR, 2019; 
Appendix C). 
Today, the key maritime safety challenges in Norwegian waters are crew experience, training 
and expertise, bridge manning and Bridge Resource Management (BRM), fatigue, personal 
factors, stress and commercial pressure and confined and complex waters (NCA, 2015). 
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Combining the maritime safety challenges with the increased activity, utilizing larger parts of 
the shoulder season including winter cruises, and new regulations in the polar areas, it is no 
doubt that they will influence each other. The importance of preventive actions towards 
mitigating risks is clear, and this thesis aims to highlight these. The objective for serious 
operators should be to operate in polar waters at the same risk level as in other waters by 
appropriate treatment and mitigation of additional risk factors, as illustrated in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Arctic Risk Factors (DNVGL, 2008) 
 
1.2 Scope and Research Theme 
The mandatory Polar Code has forced shipping segments operating in polar waters to 
implement a new operational framework. This involves new operational assessments, new 
manuals and procedures, as well as new training and certification for the crew.  
The main research theme for this thesis is how the polar cruise shipping segment is 
implementing the Polar Code. From this research theme I have derived two research 
questions: 
RQ1: What are the challenges related to the implementation of the Polar Code? 
RQ2: How are previous lessons learned, non-conformities and near misses used in the 
implementation of the Polar Code? 
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The aim of the thesis is to provide knowledge about the implementation of the Polar Code in 
the polar cruise shipping segment, and to identify challenges related to this process. To 
answer the research questions, I have developed a questionnaire (Appendix A) aimed towards 
the polar cruise shipping segment. It attempts to identify the challenges in the Polar Code, and 
to gain knowledge on how the process of implementing the new regulations are conducted. 
Furthermore, the questionnaire aims to identify how previous lessons learned, non-
conformities and near misses are utilized in developing new or updating existing manuals and 
procedures. 
Further, a root cause analysis of a cruise vessel grounding in the Canadian Arctic is 
conducted, using methods from reliability engineering. A review of relevant theory and 
literature has been undertaken, and the findings from the survey and the root cause analysis 
are discussed.  
1.3 Limitations 
Geographically, the thesis is limited to the extent of Arctic waters according to the Polar Code 
(IMO, 2016), however it can also be relevant for the Antarctic waters as well as areas with 
similar characteristics such as the coast along Northern Norway. The incident analysed in this 
thesis occurred in the Canadian Arctic where the geographical remoteness and enormity are 
particularly evident. Furthermore, the thesis will focus on the polar cruise shipping segment. 
Both the root cause analysis and the discussion of survey may be subject to the author’s 
predispositions and understanding of the context. This bias is hard to avoid when working 
alone. 
1.4 Structure 
Chapter 1 – Introduction describes the background for the thesis and explains the research 
theme and the research questions. The scope of the thesis as well as the limitations is also 
described here. 
Chapter 2 – Methodology explains the different methods used in the thesis. Both the overall 
case study method and the approach towards the survey is described, as well as the different 
logical models utilized in root cause analysis, risk analysis and risk assessment. 
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Chapter 3 – Maritime Safety contains the description of safety management and relevant 
regulations, and the maritime safety challenges are explained. Relevant terms for the root 
cause analysis are also described here. 
Chapter 4 – Root Cause Analysis of the Clipper Adventurer Grounding is an analysis of the 
incident using the Hybrid Model. The findings from the accident report are utilized in 
reliability engineering models to enhance the ability to extract lessons learned to prevent an 
incident from reoccurring. 
Chapter 5 – Results and Discussion presents the findings from the root cause analysis and 
the survey and discuss them in relation to the maritime safety challenges. 
Chapter 6 – Summary and Concluding Remarks summarizes the work and addresses the 





















2.1 Case Study 
The scope of a case study is described as “an empirical enquiry that 
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-
world context, especially when 
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” (Yin, 
2014). 
It is not only a method of approach or data collection, but a comprehensive method for 
covering all aspects of a study such as design, data collection techniques and approaches to 
data analysis. 
A case study can combine qualitative and quantitative methods or consist of one or the other. 
A qualitative method is used on small groups or few subjects, is more in-depth and provides 
more detailed descriptions of events and experiences. A case study can be descriptive 
(describes the “case” in its real-world context), explanatory (explains how or why some 
condition came to be) or exploratory (identifies the case and provides basis for further 
studies). In addition, a case study is appropriate when the research questions start with “how” 
or “why” (Yin, 2014). 
This thesis is designed as an exploratory case study, to identify how the polar cruise segment 
is implementing the Polar Code. The method for data collection is a qualitative open-ended 
questionnaire, seeking out qualitative information from experienced respondents. 
Furthermore, a root cause analysis is conducted on a relevant incident for explanation 
building and to provide a basis for further discussion. Logic models are utilized for the 
validity of the research design, and relevant theory is undergone for discussion and analysis of 
the research questions. 
Some of the challenges when following a case study approach can be to remain rigorous and 
follow a procedure, generalizing from a single case, the resulting in massive unreadable data 
and that it can be unclear how the method is favourable to other methods (Yin, 2014). Using 
the case study approach for this thesis is a choice based upon the suitability for the approach 




The questionnaire used for the survey is developed from the research questions, where the 
aim is: 
• To explore how a company in the polar cruise shipping segment approaches the 
implementation of the Polar Code. 
• To identify to which degree previously reported non-conformities and accidents are 
considered when developing the Polar Water Operation Manual (PWOM). 
The desired respondents for the survey are primarily from the polar cruise shipping segment. 
The company Health, Safety, Environment and Quality (HSEQ) manager/director or 
equivalent position as well as a representative from one of the ships in the company, 
preferably a master, are the ideal respondents. By acquiring data from these two perspectives 
within the company, the intention is to identify any potential differences in perceiving the 
challenges. The interview guide (Appendix A) provides the basis for the questionnaire and 
later analysis of the data and an informative text is included to explain the scope and purpose 
of the survey, as well as confidentiality and contact information. The questionnaire itself is 
made in Google Docs. 
For this survey, the main challenge proved to be the number of respondents from the desired 
shipping segment – polar cruise. Distribution of the survey towards the polar cruise shipping 
segment was conducted through the Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators 
(AECO), as they sent an invitation to their members with an informative text and the link to 
the questionnaire. Unfortunately, no AECO members responded to the survey. More direct 
efforts towards the polar cruise shipping segment were made with assistance from my 
supervisors and their network, with little luck. Because of this, none of the respondents are 
from the polar cruise shipping segment.  
The survey still received good responses. Respondents from academia as well as masters and 
other experienced officers with extensive knowledge of ice operations have submitted their 
opinions. It has proven valuable to gain the perspective of other shipping segments in this 
matter, as many interesting opinions and experiences came to light. Chapter 5 gives a 




2.3 Risk Analysis and Risk Assessment 
Kristiansen (2005) explains risk analysis as the process of calculating risk for the identified 
hazards, while risk assessment is the process of using the results obtained in the risk analysis 
to improve the safety of a system through risk reduction. There are many methods for 
identifying the hazards and unwanted events that may influence an object or a process, 
including the related causes, probabilities and consequences. Examples of such methodology 
are Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP), Hazard 
Identification (HAZID), Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), to mention 
some common ones. They all share many similarities, but the key is to have a structured 
approach towards the case at hand and to get some sort of overview in the end. Identifying 
hazards can be difficult work, it can tend to be subjective and is often restricted to the authors 
knowledge and understanding of the case (especially when conducted alone). Therefore, 
interdisciplinary groups of experts are usually working together to identify hazards. 
Put in simple terms, risk is the product of probability multiplied by consequence. To illustrate 
this, it is common to use a risk matrix, as seen in table 1. The size of the matrix is optional, 
but a bigger matrix can prove to be more accurate. The red area indicates unacceptable 
conditions and risk reducing measures are required. The yellow area indicates tolerable 
conditions, but risk reducing measures should be considered. Within the green area the 
conditions are acceptable, and we do not need to consider any risk reducing measures. 
Table 1: Example of a 5x5 risk matrix 
Consequence → 
Probability ↓ 
Minimal Low Medium High Very high 
Very high      
High      
Medium      
Low      





2.4 The Hybrid Model for Root Cause Analysis 
Labib and Read (2015) propose a thorough and integrative approach to perform a systematic 
analysis of a disaster, which can lead to learning from failures. The tools in this hybrid model, 
as shown in figure 3, are frequently used in reliability engineering, and utilizes Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA), Reliability Block Diagram (RBD), the Risk Priority Number (RPN) concept 
and Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) together with the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP). 
 
Figure 3: The Hybrid Model Structure (Labib and Read, 2015) 
 
An incident involving the grounding of a large cruise vessel in the Arctic possesses the 
potential of all three attributes of a disaster; rarity, extreme impact and retrospective 
predictability (Taleb, cited in Labib and Read, 2015). According to Labib and Read (2015) 
the analysis of disasters, or in the case of this thesis, an incident involving the grounding of a 
cruise vessel in the Arctic, can produce four main benefits. Firstly, identifying the root causes 
of what went wrong and why. Secondly, act as an early warning signal prior to the event to 
take pre-emptive measures. Thirdly, to institute long term plans to prevent similar events from 
re-occurring. Fourthly, to provide decision makers with a set of priorities for resource 




By integrating tools from reliability and systems engineering, we can structure the events 
leading to the disaster and identify the root causes. The different tools in the model are 
presented below, attempting to explain the basic concepts. The Hybrid Model is used for the 
root cause analysis in chapter 4. Figures used in the thesis that are not gathered elsewhere and 
contain a reference, are made by the author utilizing the software Edraw Max Pro v. 9.4. 
2.4.1 Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis 
The Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) approach is a valid tool for 
performing a risk assessment on a system, and it is very straight forward. It provides a good 
overview of the system and the different risks associated with the different 
modules/components/actions. The stages of the approach can be described as follows 
(Kristiansen, 2005): 
• A general description of the components 
• Description of possible failures and failure modes 
• Description of failure effects for each failure mode 
• Grading the failure effects in terms of severity, occurrence and difficulty of detection 
(or other parameters if deemed more relevant) 
• Specifying method for detection of failure modes 
• Description of how unwanted failure effects can be reduced and eliminated 
 
Risk Priority Numbers (RPN) can be used in an FMECA, as they can give us an idea of the 
risks that should be prioritized. Table 2 illustrates an RPN scaling from 1 to 5. The approach 
can be qualitative or, if enough data is available, the approach can be quantitative, and a 
different scale can be utilized. 
Table 2: Example of RPN of severity(S), occurrence(O) and Detection(D) 
Rank Severity (S) Occurrence (O) Detection (D) 
1 No effect on the system 
performance 
Failure is unlikely Certain detection of 
weakness 
2 Slight deterioration of the 
system 
Relatively few failures Good chance of detection 
3 Noticeably deterioration 
of the system 
Occasional failures May detect weakness 
4 Failure subsystem Repeated failures Not likely detection of 
weakness 
5 Affects human safety Failure is inevitable Cannot detect weakness 
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2.4.2 Fault Tree Analysis 
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a method used for analysing how unwanted events occur, as 
well as its causes (Kristiansen, 2005). It is a top-down approach for failure analysis, starting 
with an unwanted event (top event) and tracing the lower level events (intermediate events) to 
identify sub-systems and all the different causes (basic events) leading up to the top event, as 
illustrated in figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Principles of a fault tree (Kristiansen, 2005) 
The approach can be quantitative or qualitative. The quantitative approach uses the failure 
probability of the basic events and the fault tree gates to calculate the probability of the top 
event, followed by an assessment by using an importance measure for each basic event. The 
qualitative approach starts by describing the system and its subsystems and components down 
to enough level of detail, then continues by constructing the fault tree for the top event by 
using this description. The AND/OR gates describe the fault logic between the events. I.e. an 
OR-gate implies that the output event is dependent on one of the two basic events to occur. 
The AND-gate implies that the output event is dependent on both basic events to occur. An 




Figure 5: Example of a Fault Tree Model 
 
2.4.3 Reliability Block Diagram 
The Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) gives additional value to the analysis by providing 
decision makers with better understanding of the overall reliability of the model by 
highlighting vulnerable series structures and safer parallel structures (Labib and Read, 2015). 
Giving the different components a reliability value, we can calculate the system reliability. To 
increase system reliability, the number of components in series should be kept to a minimum. 
Used together with an FTA, the AND-gates are considered parallel structures and the OR-




Figure 6: Example of a Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) 
2.4.4 Analytical Hierarchy Process 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) 
method. Complex decision-making needs organized creative thinking to structure the 
problem, and this structure can be provided by a hierarchy or a network (Saaty, 2013). It also 
needs numbers and mathematics to formalize judgements and make trade-offs. The objective 
of the AHP is to act as a mental model and for prioritisation to help decision makers 
understand the environment in question (Labib and Read, 2015). The decision makers are to 
provide judgements about the relative importance of each criteria, and then specify a 
preference on each criterion for each decision alternative. 
An example of a three-level hierarchical model based on an AHP is illustrated in figure 7. The 
goal is what we want to achieve. There are three different alternatives to choose from and two 
criteria for choosing among the alternatives. Default priorities are shown as numbers in the 




Figure 7: Example of a three level Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) model 
 
The prioritization in the hierarchy is, as for the previous methods, either a qualitative process 
based on experience and the author’s understanding of the criteria, or a quantitative process 
when appropriate data is available. A pairwise comparison is made with respect to the level 
above, i.e. the criteria are compared with respect to the goal while the alternatives are 
compared with respect to the criteria. The scale utilized when comparing is an absolute scale 
of numerical numbers ranging from 1 to 9, where each value explains how the component 
contributes to the objective compared to the other. The definitions are: equal with (value 1), 
moderate with (value 3), strong with (value 5), very strong with (value 7) and extreme with 
(value 9) and the integers between for compromise, and their reciprocals (Saaty, 2013). 
The weakness of the AHP is the dependency on the judgement of the person performing the 
analysis. This is mitigated by using expert groups agreeing upon the scores (Stephen and 
Labib, 2017). 
The priorities are derived by using the traditional AHP eigenvalue method (Stephen and 
Labib, 2017), and the calculations of the eigenvalue in this thesis are made using an online 
AHP Priority Calculator (AHPPC, 2017). For a thorough review of the AHP approach, please 
consult Saaty (2013). 
In the context of the root cause analysis, the FTA model is used as the hierarchical model and 
the alternatives are other common factors to consider when trying to solve the basic events 







3 Maritime Safety 
3.1 Safety Management 
The objective of safety management is to ensure the safe and efficient execution of an 
operation and should therefore be considered an essential and integral element of the overall 
management system of an organization (Kristiansen, 2005). The maritime safety management 
regime, i.e. the rules and regulations governing safety and environmental protection in 
shipping, have evolved over time. Kristiansen (2005) explains three stages of evolution. 
Stage one is the early, basic stage which focused on the consequences of accidents resulting 
from safety related failures. In the aftermath of accidents, major efforts were made to find 
someone to blame for all the material, environmental or human casualties. There was a 
culture of punishment that identified and allocated blame, and frequently this was the people 
at the sharp end of the system, e.g. a ship officer. 
Stage two is the regulation of safety by prescription, i.e. the rules and regulations the maritime 
industry must obey. The International Convention on Load Lines (ILLC), the Convention on 
the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs), the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at SEA (SOLAS), the International Convention on 
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) and the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) form the 
basis for the prescriptive regulatory framework in shipping today. The prescribing party in the 
case of the maritime industry is the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a United 
Nations agency. The regime affects a vessel in all its life cycle, from design and construction 
via operation and modification to decommissioning. This result in a culture of compliance. 
Stage three is the culture of self-regulation, which concentrates on internal management and 
organization for safety, and encourages the establishment of targets for safety performance. 
Self-regulation emphasizes the need for every organization and individual to be responsible 
for the actions taken to improve safety. This requires the development of company-specific 
and vessel-specific safety management systems (SMS). Safety is in other words organized by 




Kristiansen (2005) also argues that these three stages must coexist to achieve safer seas, as 
each regime plays a significant part in influencing company and individual behaviour. The 
causal factors resulting in ship accidents indicates a potential for improvement related to 
human and organizational factors. 
3.2 Regulations 
The codes issued by IMO can be considered as more detailed and specific guides to achieving 
the aims of the conventions, such as the International Safety Management (ISM) Code and the 
Polar Code which are the most relevant for this thesis. The ISM Code and the Polar Code are 
mandatory under SOLAS, STCW and MARPOL, as they regulate safety, training, 
certification and environmental issues related to ship operations. The main purpose of both 
the ISM Code and the Polar Code is to provide an international standard for safety 
management, ship operations and pollution prevention in shipping. 
3.2.1 The ISM Code 
The objective of the ISM Code is to “ensure safety at sea, prevention of human injury or loss 
of life, and avoidance of damage to the environment, in particular the marine environment, 
and to property” (IMO 2018). 
To achieve this objective, the ISM Code proposes the establishment of an SMS. There are 12 
sections in part A of the ISM Code, which goes into detail on what the SMS should contain. 
Part B consists of 4 sections which regards certification and verification. The SMS provides a 
shipping company with a system that can greatly contribute towards identifying hazards, 
mitigate risks and optimize procedures. The ISM Code applies worldwide. 
A shipping company must possess a Document of Compliance (DOC) as well as a Safety 
Management Certificate (SMC) to operate vessels in compliance with the ISM Code. 
3.2.2 The Polar Code 
The aim of the Polar Code is to “provide for safe ship operation and the protection of the 
polar environment by addressing risks present in polar waters and not adequately mitigated 
by other instruments of the Organization” (IMO 2016). 
The Polar Code applies to ships operating in polar waters, which is defined in the code and 




Figure 8: Arctic - The waters north of latitude 60°N, with deviations to include waters around the southern 
exposure of Greenland, but excluding those around Iceland, the Norwegian mainland, Russia’s Kola Peninsula, 
the White Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk and Alaska’s Prince William Sound. (IMO, 2016) 
 
 
Figure 9: Antarctic - All waters south of latitude 60°S (IMO, 2016) 
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The Polar Code acknowledges the extra sensitive marine environment and hazardous 
conditions in the Arctic and Antarctic compared to other areas, hence the strengthened 
requirements to a ship and its crew. The Polar Code consists of part 1 A and B, as well as a 
part 2 A and B. Part 1A addresses safety measures through 12 chapters, while part 1B are 
recommendations. Part 2A addresses pollution prevention through 5 chapters, where part B 
also provides recommendations. Some key requirements in the Polar Code are: 
• Perform an Operational (Risk) Assessment 
• Development of a Polar Water Operation Manual (PWOM) 
• Carry a Polar Ship Certificate (PSC) 
• Carry the appropriate training certificates 
• Voyage planning to avoid areas with poor hydrographic data, remoteness ice and/or 
met ocean conditions that exceed the ship's design capabilities or limitations 
These requirements demand new documentation in order to operate in compliance with the 
Polar Code, as well as additional training of the ship officers. Other requirements are related 
to ship structure, stability, safety regarding navigation, fire, life-saving appliances (LSAs), as 
well as machinery and communication. 
To establish procedures and operational limitations, an assessment of the ship and its 
equipment should be conducted. The Polar Code include guidance for an operational 
assessment (IMO, 2016): 
• Identify relevant hazards from section 3 of the Introduction and other hazards based 
on a review of the intended operations 
• Develop a model to analyse risks considering (Refers to Formal Safety Assessment 
(FSA)): 
o development of accident scenarios 
o probability of events in each accident scenario 
o consequence of end states in each scenario 
• Assess risks and determine acceptability: 
o estimate risk levels in accordance with the selected modelling approach 
o assess whether risk levels are acceptable 
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• In the event that risk levels determined in steps 1 to 3 are considered to be too high, 
identify current or develop new risk control options that aim to achieve one or more of 
the following: 
o reduce the frequency of failures through better design, procedures, training, 
etc. 
o mitigate the effect of failures in order to prevent accidents 
o limit the circumstances in which failures may occur 
o mitigate consequences of accidents 
o incorporate risk control options for design, procedures, training and 
limitations, as applicable. 
This will form the basis for the Polar Water Operation Manual (PWOM), where the goal is to 
provide the owner, operator, master and crew with sufficient information regarding the ship's 
operational capabilities and limitations in order to support their decision-making process 
(IMO, 2016). It is a ship specific document that describes how to operate the ship in polar 
waters. The PWOM must include risk-based procedures, which considers each hazard 
identified as relevant in the operational assessment, and it is meant to act as a supplement to 
the Polar Ship Certificate (PSC). An example of how the table of contents for a PWOM can 
look like is given in Appendix D (ABS, 2016).  
The PSC is issued by a vessel’s flag administration or its authorized representatives. It will 
verify that the vessel has conducted the necessary assessments and actions to operate in polar 
waters and complies with the Polar Code. The PSC will, among other information, contain 
specific information on the operational limitations of a vessel for ice conditions, temperature, 
latitude and expected time to rescue (IMO, 2016). 
The new requirements for LSAs derive from the definition of maximum expected time of 
rescue in the Polar Code section 1.2.7. (IMO, 2016): the time adopted for the design of 
equipment and system that provide survival support. It shall never be less than 5 days. Three 
large live search and rescue (SAR) exercises have been conducted in the Svalbard area 
involving major actors from the Norwegian government, foreign and domestic academic 
institutions, as well as representatives from equipment manufacturers. The scope of these 
exercises has been to explore the gaps between existing SOLAS-equipment and the required 
Polar Code-equipment, where the functional survival requirement of 5 days after abandoning 
ship is at the centre. Important findings from these exercises involve the complicated 
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mechanisms at play when surviving in a polar environment (equipment/functionality, 
mental/physical robustness, decision making, small error-margin), as well as the need for 
adequate training and education for the crew (Solberg, Gudmestad and Kvamme, 2016;2017; 
Solberg and Gudmestad, 2018). 
The Polar Code is made mandatory for new ships from January 1st 2017, and ships 
constructed before January 1st 2017 will be required to meet the relevant requirements of the 
Polar Code by the first intermediate or renewal survey after January 1st 2018. The 
requirements on the crew members are enforced from July 2018. 
3.2.3 Other Relevant Regulations, Systems and Guidelines 
The Norwegian Maritime Authority (NMA) currently have additional rules for passenger 
ships operating in the Norwegian territorial waters around the Svalbard archipelago (NMA, 
2017). This is currently only a circular however, a consultation regarding the forthcoming 
Regulations on the construction, equipment and operation of passenger ships in the 
Norwegian territorial waters surrounding Svalbard (NMA, 2019) was recently distributed. 
The deadline for inputs was set to March 3rd, 2019, and the regulation is scheduled into force 
on January 1st, 2020. These regulations will replace the circular. 
The forthcoming regulations aim to raise the minimum safety standard requirement on 
passenger ships in the Norwegian territorial waters surrounding Svalbard. Important issues 
such as voyage planning and monitoring, minimum distances to glacier fronts, hospital 
accommodation, helicopter evacuation procedures, specific requirements to tenders, life-
saving appliances, construction, communication, navigation safety, safety management and 
safety measures in polar waters are addressed (NMA, 2019). It is worth noticing that the 
maximum expected time of rescue is defined differently in the draft of these regulations than 
in the Polar Code: The time adopted for the design of equipment and systems that provide 
survival support and could be less than 5 days (NMA, 2019). 
Canada and Russia have enforced regulatory standards in the Arctic for several years, having 
their own systems for ensuring safe operations in ice covered waters. The Canadian Arctic Ice 
Regime Shipping System (AIRSS) and the Russian Northern Sea Route Administration 
(NSRA) are administrating the functions of issuing permits and certificates, researching met-
ocean conditions, coordination of icebreaker services etc. They also have methodologies in 
place for assessing the structural capabilities and limitations in different ice regimes and 
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operational modes for ships operating in ice. In addition, IMO have issued their own 
methodology, the Polar Operational Limit Assessment Risk Indexing System (POLARIS), 
which has been developed incorporating experience and best practices from the AIRSS and 
the NSRA. Such a methodology is also a requirement in the PSC. 
POLARIS is a decision support system that can be used for voyage planning and on the ship 
bridge. It uses the actual ice class of the ship and the actual ice conditions encountered to 
determine a Risk Index Outcome (RIO), which is a way of assigning a level of risk to ice 
operations for ships with certain ice classes. Based on POLARIS, the ship can get three 
criteria for the decision to operate (Lloyds, 2016).  
• Normal operations: Not explicitly defined but it is implied that due caution and good 
seamanship are used. It is a recommendation to proceed but not to proceed blindly 
• Elevated operational risk: More caution should be used, and a speed reduction is 
recommended (recommended speed limits are included). Other mitigation methods 
can also be employed. It is a recommendation to proceed more cautiously 
• Operations subject to special consideration: Extreme caution is to be used. Suitable 
procedures should be implemented for reducing the risks including re-routing, further 
reduction in speed, and so on. For voyage planning, ice regimes where the RIO 
identifies operations subject to special consideration should be avoided. It is a 
recommendation not to proceed 
For a thorough review of POLARIS, please consult Lloyds (2016). 
The Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators (AECO) and the International 
Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO) provide guidelines aimed towards cruise 
operators in the Arctic and the Antarctic, respectively. E.g. the AECO Guidelines for 
Expedition Cruise Operations in the Arctic (AECO, 2016) provide useful insight in how to 
plan, prepare and operate tours in the Arctic. These are guidelines and should not be treated as 





3.3 Maritime Safety Challenges 
An analysis of ship accidents from 1980 groups the following as the main causal factors for 
collisions and groundings (Kristiansen 2005): 
• External conditions (i.e. the influence of external forces such as poor weather and 
waves, reduced visibility, etc.) 
• Functional failure (i.e. failure or degradation of technical equipment, functions and 
systems) 
• Less than adequate resources (i.e. inadequate ergonomic conditions, planning, 
organization and training) 
• Navigational failure (i.e. failure in manoeuvring and operation, poor understanding of 
situation, etc.) 
• Neglect (i.e. human failure, slips/lapses, and violations or deviation from routines, 
rules and instructions) 
• Other ships (i.e. the influence of failures made by other ships) 
The challenges in maritime safety today, compared to the 1980’s, are basically the same. The 
focus however, seems to be more upon the human factors and organizational aspect. Findings 
from the maritime safety analysis conducted by the Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA, 
2015), show that the key current maritime safety challenges are: Crew experience, training 
and expertise, bridge manning and Bridge Resource Management (BRM), fatigue, personal 
factors, stress and commercial pressure and confined and complex waters. Batalden & 
Sydnes (2013) further emphasises the lack of development of proper plans for shipboard 
operations (i.e. an operation manual) as a key cause of accidents.  
3.3.1 Root Causes 
Root causes/underlying causes/basic events - there are many terms - can be described as pre-
occurring causes which contribute to an event. However, if a root cause is perceived as for 
example “someone’s behaviour” then it might be likely that the accident would occur by 
another cause at another time (Rasmussen, 1997). So, the root cause should be a “real” root 
cause. Labib and Read (2015) argues that a real root cause needs to be plan and policy related 
with respect to the current status quo. They further emphasize it should lead to initiation or 
modification of operating procedures, and it needs to contribute to the three features of 
learning from failures; feedback to design of existing procedures, use of advanced techniques 




A root cause analysis of 65 reported marine incidents and accidents in the Arctic from 1993 to 
2011 (Kum and Sahin, 2015) highlight several root causes related to grounding and 
collision/contact, which also relate to the current maritime safety challenges: Conditions had 
greater effect than expected, manoeuvrability, competence, training which itself is 
inadequate, procedures inadequate, equipment not available, inadequate mode/scale/datum 
selected, no passage planning, no positions fixed, fatigue, task difficulty, visibility and speed - 
too fast for insufficient action taken. 
The root causes of incidents and accidents will increase or magnify when operating in polar 
waters, mainly due to the extreme met-ocean conditions and environmental factors. 
3.3.2 Contributing Factors 
Contributing factors of an incident or accident are related to broader issues than the root 
causes. By viewing the incident from a political, societal, theoretical or managemental 
perspective, we can describe it in a different way. Regulatory, organizational, procedural and 
design failures are examples of contributing factors. Kristiansen (2005) also emphasize the 
safety culture in an organization as an important causation of incidents, illustrated in figure 
10. 
 
Figure 10: Causation of incidents (Kristiansen, 2005) 
3.3.3 Human Factors 
According to Rothblum et.al. (2002), maritime technology today is very advanced and highly 
reliable, yet incidents and accidents keep occurring. The maritime system is a people system, 
and human errors figure prominently in casualty situations. About 75-96% of marine 
casualties are caused, at least in part, by some form of human error. A human error can be 




action. Human errors are generally caused by technologies, environments, and organizations 
which are incompatible in some way with optimal human performance (Rothblum et.al, 
2002). Human factors can appear both as root causes and contributing factors, and they are 
the most important factor to consider related to incidents and accidents. The most common 
human factors are listed below. 
Fatigue: Exhaustion, tiredness. In the maritime system, long working-hours and high work-
loads are the main contributor to fatigue. Fatigue has been cited as the “number one” concern 
of mariners in two different studies (Rothblum et.al, 2002). 
Communication: Inadequate communication internally on board the ship, ship-ship or ship-
shore can be fatal. Good procedures and training can improve communication. Bridge 
Resource Management (BRM) - a concept originating from aviation - is a great contribution 
towards improving communication in the maritime system. 
Complacency: Self-satisfaction - especially when accompanied by unawareness of actual 
dangers or deficiencies. When the working days are very similar, and the mariner is 
comfortable with the tasks at hand, it is easy to fall in to a routine state where everything is 
“business as usual”. The guard is dropped, and the (false) sense of security is present. Again, 
BRM is a great contribution to mitigate complacency. 
Technical Knowledge: Lack of knowledge on how to operate ship equipment such as 
Integrated Bridge Navigation System (IBNS), Integrated Machinery Control System (IMCS) 
and Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), as well as single components 
such as the navigation radar, echo sounder or gyro compass. There are many complex 
components and systems working together, and information can be lost due to improper use 
due to lack of knowledge. 
Poor Design of Equipment: Equipment on a ship bridge usually originate from several 
different manufacturers with equally many designs and interfaces, and this will in turn vary 
from one ship to another. Complexity and level of integration can lead to single failures, 
which can give total loss of sensor information and source, which in turn can make error 
location and mitigation difficult. Design standardization combined with proper training and 
crew allocation can improve the issue. 
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Decisions Based on Inadequate Information:  Failure to consult available information, either 
due to lack of technical knowledge or otherwise, can be fatal. 
Poor Judgement: Actions not exercising good seamanship fall under this category. Passing 
too close, excessive speed and taking risks in general. 
Faulty Standards, Policies or Practises: Sometimes, human error is due to poor procedures, 
poor management policies, risk-taking due to economic issues etc. This category is closely 
related to the contributing factors. 
3.3.4 Preparedness 
The main factors affecting SAR operations in polar areas are: long distances, severe weather, 
ice and cold conditions, poor communications network, lack of resources presence in the 
region, the capacity to hoist patients, achieving situational awareness, lack of infrastructure 
and unsuitable evacuation and survival equipment (FBG, 2017). The 8 Arctic countries have 
responsibilities covering an enormous area, illustrated in figure 11. 
 




The 8 Arctic countries have different capabilities and different challenges, depending on the 
localization. The SAR agreement issued by the Arctic Council ensures cooperation between 
the countries. This is briefly mentioned in Appendix C.   
3.3.5 Environment 
The Polar Code lists sources of hazards which may lead to elevated levels of risk due to 
increased probability of occurrence, more severe consequences, or both (IMO, 2016). Some 
of these sources of hazards describe the environment well: 
• Ice, as it may affect hull structure, stability characteristics, machinery systems, 
navigation, the outdoor working environment, maintenance and emergency 
preparedness tasks and malfunction of safety equipment and systems 
• experiencing topside icing, with potential reduction of stability and equipment 
functionality 
• low temperature, as it affects the working environment and human performance, 
maintenance and emergency preparedness tasks, material properties and equipment 
efficiency, survival time and performance of safety equipment and systems 
• extended periods of darkness or daylight as it may affect navigation and human 
performance 
• high latitude, as it affects navigation systems, communication systems and the quality 
of ice imagery information 
• remoteness and possible lack of accurate and complete hydrographic data and 
information, reduced availability of navigational aids and seamarks with increased 
potential for groundings compounded by remoteness, limited readily deployable SAR 
facilities, delays in emergency response and limited communications capability, with 
the potential to affect incident response 
• potential lack of ship crew experience in polar operations, with potential for human 
error 
• potential lack of suitable emergency response equipment, with the potential for 
limiting the effectiveness of mitigation measures 
• rapidly changing and severe weather conditions, with the potential for escalation of 
incidents 
• the environment with respect to sensitivity to harmful substances and other 
environmental impacts and its need for longer restoration 
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A recent study carried out by the Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) on behalf of the 
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) Work Group of the Arctic 
Council, breaks down the above-mentioned factors to quantify the additional Arctic risk, 
named ARIF (Arctic Risk Influencing Factors). This is illustrated in table 3. 
To summarize, the environmental conditions are harsh but nonetheless fragile. Extra caution 
is needed when operating in these areas, and the Polar Code is an important contribution 





4 Root Cause Analysis of the Clipper Adventurer 
Grounding 
An incident is examined using the Hybrid Model (Labib and Read, 2015) – the incident can 
be considered representative for the challenges that are present in polar waters. The incident 
in question is the grounding of the passenger vessel Clipper Adventurer in 2010 in Coronation 
Gulf, Nunavut in the Canadian Arctic. A systematic approach, utilizing the findings from the 
investigation report conducted by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB), is 
conducted to analyse the root causes of the grounding. The results will be further discussed in 
chapter 5.  
4.1 Synopsis 
On 27 August 2010, the passenger vessel Clipper Adventurer ran aground in Coronation Gulf, 
Nunavut while on a 14-day Arctic cruise. The vessel had a crew of 69 and 128 passengers on 
board at the time of the grounding, a total of 197 people on board. On 29 August, all 128 
passengers were transferred to the Canadian Coast Guard Ship (CCGS) Amundsen and taken 
to Kugluktuk, Nunavut. The Clipper Adventurer was refloated on 14 September 2010 and 
escorted to Port Epworth, Nunavut. There was minor pollution and no injuries (TSB, 2012). 
The Clipper Adventurer is a typical passenger vessel, as seen in figure 12. The vessel is built 
in 1975 with a length of 90,91 metres and a draught of 4,5-4,6 metres. The superstructure 
stretches the length of the vessel abaft a short foredeck. The hull is ice-strengthened, and the 
vessel has 2 controllable-pitch propellers and 2 semi-balanced flap rudders for improved 
manoeuvrability (TSB, 2012).  
 
Figure 12: The Clipper Adventurer (TSB, 2012) 
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The navigational equipment comprises of 2 radars, 2 Electronic Chart System (ECS), 2 
Global Positioning System (GPS), 1 echo-sounder, a Navigational Telex (NAVTEX), and a 
Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) station with Inmarsat-C Enhanced 
Group Call (EGC). The Clipper Adventurer is also fitted with a forward-looking sonar (FLS) 
mounted on the head of the bulbous bow; however, it was unserviceable at the time of the 
occurrence (TSB, 2012). The vessel had been extensively used in adventure cruises since 
1998 and was classed 100 A1 Ice Class 1A Passenger Ship by Lloyd’s Register. 
The investigation report concludes with six findings as to causes and contributing factors 
(TSB, 2012). These findings are: no voyage planning, high speed, FLS defect, no chart 

















By using the findings from the investigation report (TSB, 2012), input to a Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) of the incident is provided. The FTA visualizes the basic events leading to 
intermediate events, which in turn culminate in the grounding of the Clipper Adventurer, 
illustrated in figure 13. The FTA starts with categorizing the causal factors into direct causes 
and contributing factors. In this case the direct causes are specific actions or component 
failure that lead to the incident, while contributing factors are procedural, managemental or 
organizational causes contributing to the outcome. 
 
Figure 13: Fault Tree Analysis of the Clipper Adventurer grounding 
 
The AND/OR gates describe the fault logic between the events. I.e. the gate underneath the 
intermediate event human error is an OR-gate, implying the output event human error is 
dependent on one of the two basic events to occur. In other words, either a no voyage 
planning fault OR a high-speed fault will result in human error. In turn, due to the AND-gate 
underneath the intermediate event direct causes, this event is dependent on both human error 





To improve the overall system reliability, a Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) is constructed. 
An RBD gives an overview of the system where AND-gates create parallel structures, 
indicating relatively safe areas. OR-gates create series structures, which are less safe – less 
reliable. For the grounding of the Clipper Adventurer, figure 14 show that the direct causes 
are modelled in a relatively safe parallel structure, while the contributing factors are modelled 
in a lesser safe series structure which make them more vulnerable i.e. a larger contribution. 
 












4.4 FMECA and RPN 
With the basic events identified, we develop a basic Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA) to show each component – event – mode of failure, the effect, the cause 
of failure and how to mitigate the failure. In addition, a FMECA give us a Risk Priority 
Number (RPN) which we use to prioritize the events and show us which events should be 
focused upon. 
The RPN is a product of three models; the probability of occurrence of the failure (O), the 
severity of the failure (S) and the difficulty of detection of the failure (D). The three models 
range from 1 to 5, as seen in table 4 to 6. It is important to note that this is a subjective tool 
and the numbering of the models is based on the author’s understanding of the event in 
question. 
Table 4: RPN Word Model for FMECA of the Direct Causes and Contributing Factors of the grounding of the 
Clipper Adventurer in terms of probability of Occurrence (O) 
Keyword Score 






Table 5: RPN Word Model for FMECA of the Direct Causes and Contributing Factors of the grounding of the 
Clipper Adventurer in terms of Severity (S) 
Keyword Score 
Repair cost only 1 
Minor property damage 2 
Significant property and minor environmental damage 3 
Major property and significant environmental damage 4 
Loss of life, major property and environmental damage 5 
 
Table 6: RPN Word Model for FMECA of the Direct Causes and Contributing Factors of the grounding of the 
Clipper Adventurer in terms of difficulty of Detection (D) 
Keyword Score 








By developing a FMECA, Labib and Read (2015) emphasizes three main achievements. 
Firstly, we utilize a straight forward step-by-step technique that is universally accepted as a 
method for systematically determining the ways in which failure can occur and the effects 
each failure can have on overall functionality. Secondly, we can anticipate the failures and 
prevent them from occurring. And thirdly, with a good FMECA we can identify known and 
potential failure modes, cause and effect of each failure mode and provide for problem 
follow-up and corrective action and prioritize according to the RPN. 
Table 7 shows the six basic events using an FMECA. The effect of the failure is explained, 
followed by the cause of the failure, RPN calculation and risk mitigating measures. 
The score from the word models resulting in an RPN are subjective and based on the author’s 
understanding of the incident. It is worth noticing that the severity – S – in the FMECA is 
very high in all failures. This is based upon the area in question and the available search and 
rescue (SAR) resources in this area. The Canadian arctic is an extremely large area, and most 
of the SAR resources are based in the south. The distances and the climate are the two largest 
concerns for SAR entities when an incident occurs in polar areas. Human error: No voyage 
plan, Human error: High speed and Inadequate safety management system stands out as the 
three failures with the highest RPN. 
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The FTA model is used as the hierarchical model in the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). 
For this analysis, two AHP models are developed; one for the direct causes of the grounding 
and the other for the contributing factors. This is done to consider them as series and parallel 
structures, as seen from the RBD. The alternatives are now other common factors to consider 
when trying to solve the basic events. These factors are: the probability of re-occurrence 
when the basic event remains unsolved, the safety impact (severity) caused by the basic event 
and the cost incurred when trying to device a solution (Stephen and Labib, 2017). These three 
common factors are considered as decision variables since any decision taken will focus on 
mitigation against risk in the form of both probability of re-occurrence and severity as well as 
resource allocation in terms of cost incurred. These other common factors are the same as the 
ones used in the reference (Stephen and Labib, 2017), as they are transferable to the context in 
this analysis. An illustrative AHP model for this analysis is shown in figure 15. 
 
 






4.5.1 Direct Causes 
 
 
Figure 16: AHP model of the direct causes of the Clipper Adventurer grounding 
 
The hierarchy in figure 16 represents the decision. There are three different alternatives to 
choose from and three criteria for choosing among the alternatives. First, a pairwise 
comparison of the criteria with respect to the direct causes is executed to derive the priorities. 
To demonstrate the whole process, table 8 shows the reasoning behind this pairwise 
comparison, where the authors subjective considerations make use of the absolute scale 
ranging from 1 to 9 (Saaty, 2013). The calculations made for deriving the priority from the 
eigenvalue method (Stephen and Labib, 2017), are conducted by using the online AHP 













No voyage plan is considered a moderately greater (3) contribution 







No voyage plan is strongly favoured (5) over the FLS defect towards 
causing the grounding. 




High speed is strongly favoured (5) over the FLS defect towards 
causing the grounding. The FLS defect should have been well known 
and actions to compensate should have been initiated, i.e. reduce speed. 
 




High Speed FLS Defect Priority Rank 
No Voyage 
Planning 
1 3 5 0,618 1 
High Speed 1 3⁄  1 5 0,297 2 
FLS Defect 1 5⁄  
1
5⁄  1 0,086 3 
 
Next, the alternatives are compared with respect to the criteria. As for the previous pairwise 
comparison it is based on the authors subjective considerations, however now only the results 
will be shown in tables 10 to 12. For the convenience in the given tables; Safety Impact of the 
Event = SI, Probability of Re-occurrence if Remain Unsolved = PR and Cost of Devising a 
Solution = CD. 
Table 10: Pairwise comparison of alternatives with respect to No Voyage Plan 
  SI PR CD Priority Rank 
SI 1 3 7 0,669 1 
PR 1 3⁄  1 3 0,243 2 
CD 1 7⁄  
1




Table 11: Pairwise comparison of alternatives with respect to High Speed 
 SI PR CD Priority Rank 
SI 1 2 7 0,574 1 
PR 1 2⁄  1 7 0,361 2 
CD 1 7⁄  
1
7⁄  1 0,065 3 
 
Table 12: Pairwise comparison of alternatives with respect to FLS Defect 
 SI PR CD Priority Rank 
SI 1 1 2⁄  3 0,292 2 
PR 2 1 7 0,615 1 
CD 1 3⁄  
1
7⁄  1 0,093 3 
 
Finally, the priorities of the criteria are multiplied with the priorities of each alternative and 
summarized. The synthesis of the priorities of the alternatives with respect to the direct 
causes is given in table 13. 










SI 0,413 0,170 0,025 0,608 1 
PR 0,150 0,107 0,053 0,310 2 
CD 0,054 0,019 0,008 0,081 3 
 
The alternative safety impact of the event (SI) is considered the highest priority with respect to 
the direct causes with 60,8 percent. It is considered almost twice as important as the second-








4.5.2 Contributing Factors 
 
 
Figure 17: AHP model of the contributing factors of the Clipper Adventurer grounding 
 
Again, the hierarchy in figure 17 represents the decision. There are three different alternatives 
to choose from and three criteria for choosing among the alternatives. First, a pairwise 
comparison of the criteria with respect to the contributing factors is executed to derive the 
priorities. To demonstrate the whole process, table 14 shows the reasoning behind this 
pairwise comparison, where the authors subjective considerations make use of the absolute 
scale ranging from 1 to 9 (Saaty, 2013). The calculations made for deriving the priority from 
the eigenvalue method (Stephen and Labib, 2017), are conducted by using the online AHP 






Table 14: Reasoning behind pairwise comparison of the criteria with respect to the contributing factors 
No Chart 
Correction 
1 Inadequate SMS 3 
Inadequate SMS is moderately favoured (3) over no chart 







No chart correction is slightly favoured (2) over 








Inadequate SMS is very strongly favoured (7) over 
NOTSHIP not obtained towards contributing to the 
grounding. 
 












1 1 3⁄  2 0,216 2 
Inadequate 
SMS 







7⁄  1 0,103 3 
 
Next, the alternatives are compared with respect to the criteria. As for the previous pairwise 
comparison it is based on the authors subjective considerations, however now only the results 
will be shown in tables 16 to 18. Again, for the convenience in the given tables; Safety Impact 
of the Event = SI, Probability of Re-occurrence if Remain Unsolved = PR and Cost of 
Devising a Solution = CD. 
Table 16: Pairwise comparison of alternatives with respect to No Chart Correction 
 SI PR CD Priority Rank 
SI 1 1 3⁄  6 0,285 2 
PR 3 1 8 0,653 1 
CD 1 6⁄  
1




Table 17: Pairwise comparison of alternatives with respect to Inadequate SMS 
 SI PR CD Priority Rank 
SI 1 2 7 0,566 1 
PR 1 2⁄  1 8 0,373 2 
CD 1 7⁄  
1
8⁄  1 0,061 3 
 
Table 18: Pairwise comparison of alternatives with respect to NOTSHIP Not Obtained 
 SI PR CD Priority Rank 
SI 1 1 3⁄  5 0,279 2 
PR 3 1 7 0,649 1 
CD 1 5⁄  
1
7⁄  1 0,072 3 
 
Again, the priorities of the criteria are multiplied with the priorities of each alternative and 
summarized. The synthesis of the priorities of the alternatives with respect to the contributing 
factors is given in table 19. 















SI 0,062 0,379 0,029 0,470 1 
PR 0.141 0,254 0,067 0,462 2 
CD 0,013 0,042 0,007 0,062 3 
 
With respect to the contributing factors, the alternative safety impact of the event (SI) is 
considered just slightly more important than the alternative probability of re-occurrence if 








The owners of the Clipper Adventurer were ruled responsible of the grounding and will have 
to pay nearly 500000 dollars in environmental costs to the Canadian government (CBC, 
2017). This sets an important precedence, as the decision reads “Had Officer Mora … taken 
serious note of the publications with which he was required to be familiar, he would have 
known perfectly well that there were written NOTSHIPs [notices to shipping], and that if he 
could not get them by visiting the Canadian Coast Guard website, all he had to do was call 
MCTS Iqaluit” (CBC, 2017). The decision further states that “As it was, this nonchalant 
attitude put the lives of close to 200 souls at risk” (CBC, 2017). This emphasises the 
importance of a good safety culture, good Bridge Resource Management (BRM) and a proper 
and dynamic safety management system (SMS) on board a vessel operating in the Arctic. The 
Polar Code is a huge step in the right direction, forcing ship owners and management 
companies to revise and update their plans and standard operating procedures (SOPs). 
4.6.2 Organizational Changes 
As of January 2019, the Canadian Coast Guard’s Maritime Communication Traffic Service 
(MCTS) program has launched a national navigational warning (NAVWARN) issuing service 
to replace the existing domestic NOTSHIP services. The new NAVWARN Issuing System 
will provide greater harmonization in both the format and content of navigational warnings 
(MARINFO, 2019). This was one of the risk findings after the Clipper Adventurer grounding 
(TSB, 2012), and it is a great contribution towards reducing the risk of communication failure 
due to different terminology. A minimum of standardized terminology should be in place for 
actors operating in polar areas, reducing the risks even further. 
4.6.3 A Similar Incident 
The passenger ship Akademik Ioffe ran aground in the Gulf of Boothia near Kugarook in the 
Canadian Arctic on August 24th, 2018, carrying 162 passengers and crew on board. The 
incident shares many similarities to the Clipper Adventurer in terms of damage potential and 
is still under investigation by the TSB. In the case of the Ioffe incident, one difference 
compared to the Clipper Adventurer stands out. The Akademik Sergey Vavilov, the sister ship 
of the Ioffe, was the closest vessel and the first to arrive the scene to assist, apparently by 
chance. Acting as a “buddy”, the two vessels could utilize the same small boats and the same 
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davits to transfer people from the Ioffe to the Sergey Vavilov. As a bonus, the passengers 
knew their way around the Sergey Vavilov. Though coincidental, this serves as a good 
example of the buddy system in action. We may not always have two identical vessels pairing 
up, but it is a reminder that a minimum of standardization, e.g. ability to use each other’s 





5 Results and Discussion 
What encourages risk taking when operating a vessel? Good seamanship would be to play it 
safe and avoid danger, always thinking ahead. The results from the root cause analysis of the 
Clipper Adventurer grounding and the responses from the survey are presented below and 
discussed in relation to maritime safety challenges and the research questions. The discussion 
highlights the importance of preventive actions towards mitigating risks in polar waters, due 
to the severity of the potential consequences when cruise ships are involved. 
5.1 Root Cause Analysis 
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), in which the top event is the grounding of the Clipper 
Adventurer, derives two immediate intermediate events; direct causes and contributing 
factors, as well as a third placed under the direct causes; human error. There are six basic 
events in total. The FTA illustrates how the different events depend on each other and how 
they together contribute to the occurrence of the top event. 
The six basic events in the FTA derive from the findings in the investigation report (TSB, 
2012). The direct causes consist of three basic events. No voyage planning represents the 
bridge team and them choosing not to follow the company voyage planning procedures, while 
high speed represents the bridge team and their decision to steam full ahead even though they 
were in unchartered waters. Either of these two events result in human error. FLS Defect is a 
specific component failure that contributed directly to the incident. Further, the contributing 
factors in the grounding of the Clipper Adventurer are the last three basic events. No chart 
correction represents the mapping authorities not issuing a chart correction even though the 
shoal was known. Inadequate SMS represent the SMS on board lacking proper safeguards to 
mitigating well-known risks. NOTSHIP not obtained represent the difficulty in obtaining the 
NOTSHIP in question – in this case a combination of procedural and organizational causes. 
The Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) show that the direct causes are modelled in a 
relatively safe parallel structure, while the contributing factors are modelled in a lesser safe 
series structure which make them more vulnerable. This indicates that the occurrence of only 
one contributing factor (series) will have a larger impact on the event than a direct cause 
(parallel), i.e. a contributing factor will “contribute more” to the event. Hence, the 
contributing factors should be given more equal priority between each other. 
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The Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) illustrate the events as 
components that fail, what causes the failures and how to mitigate the risks related to them. A 
FMECA is best applicable for failure modes, therefore the Risk Priority Numbers (RPN) for 
the direct causes are most representative. The contributing factors are more subjectively 
assessed than the direct causes, and the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) can provide a 
better prioritizing of the contributing factors. The RPN values are shown in table 20 below. 
Table 20: RPN values from the FMECA 
Component and 
Mode of Failure 
RPN Rank 
Inadequate SMS 45 1 
Human error: No 
voyage plan 
45 2 
Human error: High 
speed 
45 3 




FLS defect 12 6 
The ranking is based on the author’s subjective understanding, as discussed below. 
Human error: No voyage planning. According to the investigation report (TSB, 2012) the 
bridge team chose to navigate a route on an inadequately surveyed single line of soundings. 
Had the bridge team chosen to go through with a proper voyage planning procedure in 
accordance with IMO res A.893 (21) Guidelines for Voyage Planning, they might have 
become aware of the Notice to Shipping (NOTSHIP) warning of the shoal and they might 
have chosen a different route. The effect of these actions is obvious – the ship is sailing in 
unchartered waters. This involves high risk regardless of where the ship is operating. To 
reduce the risk of this failure, a good safety culture within the bridge team must be 
established. This is achieved with high competence in Bridge Resource Management (BRM) 
and a safety management system (SMS) that cover all risks that may occur. 
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Human error: High speed. The Clipper Adventurer was proceeding at full speed, even 
though they were in unchartered waters, the forward-looking sonar (FLS) was defective and 
they were not on a planned route (TSB, 2012). By heading at full speed, several aspects need 
to be considered. For example, the time to make decisions is reduced, the damage potential is 
greater, and hydrodynamic effects may also start affecting the ship. These are important 
aspects for the bridge team to bear in mind. Risk reducing measures to prevent this failure of 
happening again is like the previous failure; BRM competence, an adequate SMS and good 
seamanship. 
FLS defect. The inoperative state of the FLS resulted in the Clipper Adventurer having no 
shipboard means of assessing the water depth ahead of the vessel (TSB, 2012). The fault is 
easily detected and should have resulted in extra vigilance from the bridge team, being 
deprived of one of their most important sensors. To prevent this failure from re-occurring, the 
maintenance scheme, the shipboard spare parts storage and the shipboard competence should 
be investigated. Also, one could argue that the operational area of the ship is reduced when 
losing this sensor. An adequate SMS and a proper maintenance schedule could have 
prevented this cause. 
No chart correction. As explained in the investigation report (TSB, 2012), the Canadian 
Hydrographic Service (CHS) Central and Arctic did not issue a chart correction. This meant 
that the bridge team was deprived one source of information about the shoal (the other being 
the NOTSHIP). Published charts are subject to amendments and corrections as new 
information becomes available. The CHS Central and Arctic practices not to issue and apply 
chart corrections when the hydrographic data does not meet their demands, as do many other 
hydrographic services. However, the information of the shoal, obtained by the CCGS Sir 
Wilfrid Laurier, did meet the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) criteria for a 
chart modification in a remote area. In this case the symbols for Position Approximate (PA) 
or Position Doubtful (PD) could have been used. But, the CHS Central and Arctic tries to 
avoid issuing PAs or PDs on arctic charts because of the risk that incorrect or incomplete 
information in poorly surveyed areas could mislead mariners as to the true location of the 
hazard, or onto another unreported hazard. So, the shoal was known but there was no chart 
correction issued. The CHS Central and Arctic could investigate the procedures within their 




Inadequate safety management system. The ship management company’s SMS did not 
provide the bridge team with proper safeguards to mitigate well-known risks. This includes 
revision of the voyage plan in conjunction with the management company; assurance that the 
FLS was operable; use of the zodiacs with portable echo-sounders when necessary; assurance 
that the vessel transited at lower speed when operating in poorly charted areas; and 
acquisition of NOTSHIPs local navigation warnings (TSB, 2012). Had the proper tools for 
identifying the (well-known) risks been in place, the Clipper Adventurer might have avoided 
the grounding. Again, the importance of a proper SMS and dynamic risk assessments are key 
elements to safe ship operations. 
NOTSHIP not obtained. The shoal had been previously identified and reported in a 
NAVWARN, at the time called a NOTSHIP in Canada. However, the bridge team was 
unaware of and did not actively access local NOTSHIPs, nor did the Canadian Arctic Marine 
Traffic System (NORDREG) specifically advise them of the NOTSHIPs applicable to the 
vessel’s area of navigation (TSB, 2012). Amongst the risk findings in the investigation report 
(TSB, 2012), when NOTSHIPs are no longer broadcast, vessels operating in Canadian Arctic 
waters can only obtain the information on written NOTSHIPs by specific requests to 
Maritime Communication Traffic Services (MCTSs) or by accessing the Canadian 
Coastguard website. In areas with unreliable internet connectivity, this may limit the 
mariner’s awareness of known hazards. Also, the term “Notice to Shipping” is not used 
outside Canada, whereas the terms Local Warning or Navigational Warning are more widely 
used and recognized by foreign crews. Herein lies the causes of this failure; the unavailability 
of the information combined with the unfamiliar local terminology of the NOTSHIP and the 
inadequate voyage planning procedures. To reduce the risk of this failure, an organizational 
investigation may identify some areas of interest (availability of the information and 
terminology), and a revision of the SMS and voyage planning procedures by the ship 
management company is recommended. 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) provided a numerical representation of the author’s 
judgements, and it was interesting to see how the numbers came out. They largely represent 
the author’s view on the matter, and obviously they are subject to the bias concerning the 
author’s predispositions and understanding of the context. The accuracy of the outcome of the 
Hybrid Model process could likely be improved by having a group of subject matter experts 
involved, as is often the case for qualitative risk analysis. 
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The result of the AHP is the priority of the alternatives with respect to the direct causes and 
the contributing factors as shown in table 21. 
Table 21: Summary of priorities of alternatives 
 Direct Causes 
Contributing 
Factors 











With respect to the direct causes, the alternative safety impact of the event is considered the 
highest priority with 60,8 percent. It is considered almost twice as important as the second-
highest ranked alternative probability of re-occurrence if remain unsolved with 31,0 percent, 
which in turn is almost four times as important as the cost of devising a solution with 8,1 
percent. This indicates that the direct causes (no voyage planning, high speed and FLS 
Defect) contribute greatly to the safety impact of the event. I.e. the severity would be less if 
the bridge team had a voyage plan or the speed was reduced. 
With respect to the contributing factors, the alternative safety impact of the event is 
considered just slightly more important than the alternative probability of re-occurrence if 
remain unsolved, with 47,0 percent and 46,2 percent respectively. They are as good as equally 
ranked and they are both considered almost eight times as important as the cost of devising a 
solution with 6,2 percent. This indicates that the contributing factors (inadequate SMS, no 
chart correction and NOTSHIP not obtained) are more equally contributing to both the safety 
impact of the event and the probability of re-occurrence if remain unsolved. 
For both direct causes and contributing factors, the cost of devising a solution have the lowest 
priority. This is simply explained by the author’s opinion that the cost should not be an issue 
when it comes to safety. The safety impact and the probability of re-occurence will always 
outweigh the cost when it comes to the safety of human life. If the solution is to revise the 




The questionnaire, as shown in Appendix A, generated 7 responses, where 5 have answered 
all the questions. Although none of the respondents are from the cruise industry, several 
challenges have been mentioned in the survey that apply for cruise vessels operating under the 
Polar Code. Vessels operating in polar waters mostly face the same challenges. What 
separates cruise vessels from other vessels is the severity of the potential consequences of e.g. 
a grounding or any situation where people must abandon ship and/or be evacuated. The 
number of passengers vary from only a few dozen on board the smallest explorer vessels to 
hundreds or thousands on board the largest vessels. The SAR challenges will increase 
dramatically along with the number of passengers. The answers are presented in full in 
Appendix B, highlights are presented below.  
Q1: In your experience, what are the challenges meeting the STCW requirements of the 
Polar Code? 
• Make basic/advanced course participants aware of the dangers and limited resources 
for assistance in remote areas (R1) 
• Experience in ice of the participants in basic/advanced courses is limited – the 
benefits of a basic/advanced course for a crew with some ice experience is far better 
(R2) 
• Accumulating sea time. Advanced course requires 2 months of seagoing service in 
polar waters (as defined in the Polar Code), for most passenger ships this will take 
years (R3, R4) 
• Crew getting certificates with only summer operation experience (R5) 
• A simulator can only provide so much – real experience is needed (R6) 
Regarding the challenges related to training and certification (STCW), several issues are 
mentioned. According to the STCW Convention Regulation V/4, Section A-V/4, and Tables A-
V/4-1 and A-V/4-2, the sea time required for a certificate in advanced training for ships 
operating in polar waters is at least 2 months of approved seagoing service in the deck 
department, at management level or while performing watchkeeping duties at the operational 
level, within polar waters or other equivalent approved seagoing service. As R3 points out, 
this can take a long time for some deck officers, and when they do get their license, they may 
only be experienced in summer operations as R5 highlights. Combined with little or no 
 
53 
experience before entering a Polar Code training course, the total output of competence can 
be quite low even for a licenced deck officer. It seems there should be a distinction between 
summer and winter operations, rather than a distinction between basic and advanced courses. 
Further, a simulator can go a long way in creating a realistic training environment. Even if 
real experience in polar waters is preferred, as stated by R6, simulator experience is perhaps 
the most realistic approach in terms of time and cost. Efforts should be made towards 
achieving high standard simulators for ice conditions and polar water operations. 
Q2: In your experience, what are the challenges meeting the SOLAS requirements of the 
Polar Code? 
• There should be more detailed specifications towards the requirements (R1) 
• Vessels are not ready for a real incident even though they are complying with SOLAS 
(refers to the SARex exercises) (R2) 
• The goal-based approach for part 1 of the Polar Code does not give good standards 
for manufacturers (R2) 
• LSAs today are inadequate for polar waters and 5-day survival requirement (R3, R7) 
• Many vessels have insufficient winterization characteristics (R3) 
• Different interpretation from classification societies and flag states (R4) 
• Distinguish between summer operation and winter operation with regards to 
equipment (R5) 
• Reason must be applied when selecting area of operation and operational season with 
regards to winterization (R6) 
The main challenges related to SOLAS seem to involve the LSAs and the “5-day survival 
requirement” derived from the definition of the maximum expected time of rescue in the Polar 
Code (IMO, 2016). 5 days is a long time to survive after abandoning a ship in polar areas, and 
some might say this is impossible and only a theoretical requirement. However difficult this 
may seem, the reason for such a requirement is based on the environmental factors in the area, 
and it also points out that safety of the passengers should not be taken lightly. It is important 
to set a high standard in the beginning, and maybe there will be more specifications and 
adjustments as more experience is gained. No doubt, the requirement forces the survival 
equipment to a new level of performance and presents challenges regarding arrangements and 
capacity on board a vessel. There is ongoing work in this area both nationally and 
internationally. The forthcoming Regulations on the construction, equipment and operation of 
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passenger ships in the Norwegian territorial waters surrounding Svalbard (NMA, 2019), 
proposes a new definition of the maximum expected time of rescue as it states that it could be 
less than 5 days. This would in theory reduce the LSA requirements for the area in question 
substantially. Still, the Polar Code also requires operational (risk) assessments, procedures 
and measures to mitigate the risks and these must consider the expected time of rescue. 
Further, the IMO Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE) have drafted interim 
guidelines on life-saving appliances and arrangements for ships operating in polar waters 
(SSE, 2017), which will supplement the Polar Code. The draft specifies several important 
improvements to e.g. thermal protective aids, life rafts, life boats and rations, many which are 
based on the recommendations from SARex Spitzbergen (Solberg et.al, 2016) and SARex 2 
(Solberg et.al, 2017). The goal of the draft is to assist in the global and uniform 
implementation of the Polar Code, and it also provides more detailed specifications for 
suppliers of LSAs. Perhaps if the requirements to LSAs are specific and dimensioned for 5 
days or more, the maximum expected time of rescue definition is not so crucial. This is also 
one of the recommendations from SARex 3 (Solberg and Gudmestad, 2018), which proposes 
to define a few key parameters that enable flag states and classification societies to verify 
equipment packages in a transparent way. 
As an example, the LSA-Code paragraphs 4.1.5.1.18 and 4.1.5.1.19 requires the rations and 
fresh water on a life raft to be a total of 10000kJ per person and 1,5 litres of fresh water per 
person. The drafted interim guidelines (SSE, 2017) proposes an increase to 12000kJ per 
person per day and 2 litres of fresh water per person per day. A massive increase, and most 
certainly an expensive one if you have several hundred passengers and the appropriate 
amount of life rafts and life boats on board. Obviously, the Polar Code requirements may lead 
to high costs for a cruise vessel. 
Still, as of now the “5-day survival requirement” is in force, and most of the respondents have 
mentioned it. The LSAs on board vessels today are mostly in compliance with regulations that 
do not consider the hazards in polar waters, and therefore most vessels have inadequate LSAs 
for areas covered by the Polar Code. The SARex projects have identified many challenges 
related to survival in polar areas, and it seems there still is a way to go regarding LSAs 




R5 mentions the difference between summer and winter conditions, perhaps there should be a 
distinction also here between LSAs and equipment requirements for summer and winter 
operations. R6 states that the issues related to winterization, in terms of costs and potential 
follow-up equipment, starts with selecting the appropriate Polar Service Temperature (PST) 
for the proposed area of operation and operational season. This could be equally important 
when it comes to selecting the appropriate LSAs and equipment. 
The IMO Sub-committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR) 
also recently drafted general guidance for navigation and communication equipment intended 
for use on ships operating in polar waters (NCSR, 2018), which recommends new standards 
for equipment to adjust for the polar environment. 
Q3: In your experience, what are the challenges meeting the MARPOL requirements of the 
Polar Code? 
• Possible future challenges with regards to fuel substances with severe environmental 
impact in case of spill (R3) 
• Few receiving facilities for waste and sludge, and possibly grey water (R4, R5) 
• MARPOL focus on transiting or destinational shipping – compliance can be difficult 
for vessels spending longer periods of time in ice covered waters (R6) 
R4 and R5 highlight few receiving facilities for waste and sludge, and possibly grey water, as 
potential challenges. Receiving facilities could be expanded, but there are limitations in the 
infrastructure. A suggestion is to increase capacity on board, and strict routines for depositing 
all waste and sludge before entering polar waters. 
R3 also points out that heavy fuel oil (HFO) is allowed today, but a future prohibition may 
lead to some challenges for vessels who rely on HFO. Still, the protection of the polar 
environment is one of the main goals of the Polar Code and a spill of a substance with major 






Q4: In your company, how is the operational (risk) assessment of the ship conducted? 
• Follow classification society “templates” (R2) 
• On board prior to each ice related operation including all crew who is involved (R3) 
• Conducted by office personnel and experienced ship staff (R4) 
• Initially done by chartering, technical, HSEQ and crewing departments to check if 
vessel and crew is fit for purpose. In-house ice and arctic expertise are involved 
through the whole process (R5) 
• Combination of internal and external (R6) 
The optimal approach to the operational assessment of a ship seem to involve the different 
office departments as well as experienced crew members. The operational assessment is 
supposed to consider the anticipated range of operating and environmental conditions, such 
as: operation in low air temperature, operation in ice, operation in high latitude, the potential 
for abandonment onto ice or land, hazards (as listed in section 3 of the Introduction, as 
applicable, and additional hazards, if identified (IMO, 2016). No doubt, the inclusion of all 
involved departments, onshore and offshore, is reasonable. The operational assessment is ship 
specific, hence personnel with knowledge and experience operating the ship (deck, technical, 
engineering) is important. For newbuilds, the work towards a Polar Ship Certificate (PSC) 
should be integrated by designers and shipyard. 
Perhaps a template can provide some guidance in how to get started or where to end up, but it 
seems that all the serious operators utilize on board and in-house expertise in this process. 
This is probably easy for operators with extensive experience in polar waters, but where do 
you start when there is no expertise in-house? A solution might be external aid from 
experienced personnel. There are several consultants with extensive experience in polar 
waters offering their services. The Polar Code also offer guidance on how to perform an 
operational assessment. The guidance is a good place to start, but the input from experienced 






Q5: In your company, how is the Polar Water Operation Manual (PWOM) developed? 
• Operators already operating in polar areas for decades have most of the PWOM 
already covered in their SMS (R2, R3, R4, R5) 
• In the process of developing the PWOM, several already existing procedures and 
checklists in the SMS was updated to comply with the Polar Code and the PWOM also 
refers to this ISM document (R5) 
• For new vessels; external support from designer and shipyards. For existing vessels; 
in-house development using own subject matter experts (R6) 
An interesting finding is that well established operators already have most of the requirements 
to a PWOM covered in their existing SMS. For an operator already established in polar 
waters, naturally the existing procedures cover this, and it should not be a surprise as 
personnel with experience from polar areas are probably involved in the development of the 
Polar Code itself. Still, these operators possess valuable knowledge of operations in polar 
waters. The consultants aiding an inexperienced operator and the lecturers of basic/advanced 
courses are probably from said operators and will naturally share their knowledge in the 
process towards a PSC or during one of their basic/advanced courses. Perhaps a more 
standardized method for knowledge sharing should be established? An example of how a 
PWOM could look like is shown in Appendix D.  
Q6: In your company, who participate in the development of the Polar Water Operation 
Manual (PWOM)? 
• Manual table of contents same as for operational risk assessment, shipboard 
personnel more involved in the manual development itself (end users) (R6) 
• Mostly same as for operational risk assessment (All) 






Q7: Are the non-conformities and lessons learned from previous operations considered 
when performing the operational (risk) assessment or developing the Polar Water 
Operation Manual (PWOM)? 
• Previous experience from sub-arctic does not always compare to polar waters (R2) 
• Operators already operating in polar areas for decades have all their experience 
available in the same SMS (R2, R3, R4) 
• Debriefing after an arctic operation including all departments. Lessons learned are 
followed up to improve systems and procedures (R5) 
• Not easy to update a document stamped by the class society or flag state (R5) 
• Yes, although a very small percentage of total incidents attributed to operations in ice 
(R6) 
• The PWOM will be auditable under the organizations safety management system (R6) 
I find it an interesting remark from R2 that some of the previous experience from areas other 
than polar waters does not always compare to polar waters. This is of course true, but still 
there are many factors that apply for an operation regardless of the geographical location. It 
would be very interesting to learn how cruise operators do this, especially operators 
inexperienced in polar waters. Many expedition cruise operators have been operating in polar 
waters for many years, and it is likely to assume that they also have many of the requirements 
in the Polar Code already covered. Still, the non-conformities and lessons learned from 
previous operations should always be brought forward to improve the safety of an operation. 
It is important that the SMS document these properly, so that new personnel can access this 
knowledge and it does not leave the organization with experienced personnel. 
It is also a good routine as R5 describe it, to have a debriefing including all personnel after an 
operation, to identify important lessons and implement them in the SMS. A key concept here 
must be to do this immediately after the operation, as to ensure the capture of all elements. 
Further, all input from all involved personnel is important in this matter. If a process like this 
is conducted after every operation, over time the procedures will be optimized, and the safety 





In the offshore shipping segment, charterers influence safety management (Batalden, 2015), 
and any non-compliance or consistent lack in following procedures will result in the company 
not getting re-hired. Perhaps a regulatory regime more similar to the offshore shipping 
segment would be beneficial for the polar cruise shipping segment in terms of safety. 
Q8: Is compliance to the Polar Code considered beneficial to the company? 
• Yes, to avoid claims. One of the passengers can be a member of Greenpeace 
collecting evidence (Greenpeace is also following Basic and Advanced courses) (R2) 
• There is absolutely no reason NOT to follow the requirements in the Polar Code, 
whereas there are numberless reasons to do. Any negative attitude towards the Polar 
Code will most likely end up being an organizational suicide for any cruise company 
that travels the polar regions (R3) 
• Each competitor needs to comply as well, so there is no difference (R4) 
• We are very much depended that we have vessels complying with the code (R5) 
• Regulatory compliance is done in the spirit of the applicable codes and regulations to 
show industry that we are leading the way and face the same challenges that they do 
(Coast Guard) (R6) 
Many interesting views in this matter. From a competitive point of view, everyone is required 
to comply to the Polar Code so there should be no difference. However, there is a large 
difference between the operators and the vessels in terms of company culture, economic 
factors, age, standards and specifications of the vessels, experience in polar waters and so on. 
All these factors determine the level of compliance. Also, there is a large focus on safety and 
environmental issues, and any irregularly actions can potentially result in claims.   
I must agree with R3, there is no reason NOT to comply. Even if it seems like many of the 
challenges with the implementation of the Polar Code, e.g. the LSA requirements, seem to be 
up for discussion, the serious operators should always strive for regulatory compliance in 






Additional information: Is there something you wish to add? 
• Icing stability: in chapter 4 related to intact conditions. The scenario of icing in 
combination with damage stability is not considered. I hear that for cruise vessels this 
scenario can be a problem (R2) 
• In my opinion there should be only one Polar Code license, not two. What is the 
reason for distinguishing between basic and advanced? Either you are in polar waters 
or you are not. Either you are prepared and skilled or you are not. There is no such 
thing as "basic" or "advanced" polar conditions (R3) 
• Some of the vessels heading in to arctic never call in to one of the arctic states and is 
only visited by inspectors in "warmer" countries. Is the competence there? (R5) 
It may seem that icing in combination with damage stability is not considered in chapter 4 of 
the Polar Code. This is a good observation from R2, and further investigation would require 
more insight in the probabilistic damage stability calculations as well as knowledge of the 
icing contribution related to these calculations. 
The view of R3 regarding basic and advanced polar code licence is a fair one. A junior 
officer, who might only need a basic course today, will need an advanced course tomorrow. It 
would perhaps make more sense to have more personnel with “advanced” knowledge of polar 
waters, to strengthen the bridge team and mitigate some of the risk. 
Also, R5 indicates that a vessel could find itself in polar waters without having any 
experience, but still be complying and have all the right certification and theoretical 





6 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
As a reminder, the research theme is how the polar cruise shipping segment is implementing 
the Polar Code. The research questions are listed below. 
RQ1: What are the challenges related to the implementation of the Polar Code? 
RQ2: How are previous lessons learned, non-conformities and near misses used in the 
implementation of the Polar Code? 
There are no respondents to the survey from the cruise industry. This has consequences for 
this thesis. Most importantly, the number of respondents is obviously too low for a significant 
response rate, so the collected data must be considered unreliable for the polar cruise shipping 
segment. The collected data can provide some insight into the general shipping segment, but 
there can still be differences compared to polar cruise.  
Why no respondents from the cruise industry? The motivation level involved in answering an 
email-distributed survey from a random student about a subject where many issues are still 
unclear or under discussion, is perhaps the most key factor here? We must assume that they 
are busy implementing the Polar Code. 
The collected data is still good for providing useful insight in the general challenges. Based 
on the results and discussion of the survey, the main challenges with implementing the Polar 
Code seem to involve: 
• Issues related to basic and advanced certificate training for ships operating in polar 
waters (accumulating enough sea time, gaining experience) 
• Issues involving the “5-day survival requirement” (LSAs, economy) 
• Distinction between summer and winter operations 
• Relatively few options for waste and sludge disposal 
• Issues related to economy (LSAs, winterization) 
Furthermore, the survey shows that some experienced operators extract lessons learned after 




From the root cause analysis, the direct causes are placed in a parallel structure in the RBD 
due to the AND-gate in the FTA. The contributing factors are, due to the OR-gate in the FTA, 
placed in a series structure in the RBD and hence they give a stronger contribution than the 
direct causes towards the unwanted event. Further, the FMECA gives the highest RPN 
rankings to the direct causes Human error: No voyage plan and Human error: High speed, as 
well as the contributing factor Inadequate SMS. 
In the AHP of the direct causes, the criteria no voyage plan and high speed have the first 
(61,8%) and second (29,7%) priorities with respect to the direct causes. The alternative safety 
impact of the event has the highest (60,8%) overall priority with respect to the direct causes. 
In the AHP of the contributing factors, the criterion inadequate SMS have the highest 
(68,2%) priority with respect to the contributing factors. The alternatives safety impact of the 
event and probability of re-occurrence if remain unsolved have almost equal (47,0% and 
46,2%) priorities with respect to the contributing factors. 
These results emphasize the importance of human factors and the SMS. The human factors 
contributing to an unwanted event can be mitigated trough a healthy safety culture within the 
organization, bridge resource management (BRM) and an adequate SMS. From this, I must 
conclude that the SMS is the most important factor towards preventing an unwanted event. 
Indirectly, this is saying that today, compliance to the Polar Code is the most important factor 
towards mitigating unwanted events in polar waters. 
For the Clipper Adventurer, there is one issue the investigation report (TSB, 2012) does not 
address. Why did the bridge team deviate from the standard known route? Was the intention to 
save fuel costs, or maybe save time? Was there operational pressure from the management to 
deliver an experience so exotic that the bridge team decided to steam full speed ahead through 
unchartered waters? What does it take for the bridge team to deviate from the voyage plan? 
No doubt the commercial pressure, leading to cutting corners and saving costs and time, can 
be a major contributing factor towards an unwanted event. Stress and commercial pressure are 





From the TTX (Appendix C), one of the main takeaways was the importance of the practical 
leadership exercised by expedition leaders in a stranding scenario. This is further emphasized 
in the reports from the SARex project, which have identified large differences in groups of 
people attempting to survive on shore after an evacuation from a ship (Solberg, Gudmestad 
and Kvamme, 2016;2017; Solberg and Gudmestad, 2018). Groups that manage to keep up 
morale, who establish routines for duties and food/drink, as well as being led by a suitable 
individual, seem to survive the longest. A parallel can be drawn between the role of the 
expedition leader and the survival craft commander. One of the contributions to the SARex 3 
report emphasizes the importance of the company management being made aware that there 
should be criteria involving suitability, experience and skills related to survival in polar areas 
early in the process when hiring new personnel for on board positions. 
On a final note, it is the risk-based approach in the Polar Code that will contribute to reducing 
the identified risks in polar waters. The combination of the operational (risk) assessment, the 
PWOM, POLARIS, the functional requirements e.g. related to the LSAs, and the determined 
operational limitations will ensure the safest possible operations. If one of these are removed, 
then the other ones will become more important. The precautionary and preventive nature of 
the Polar Code is especially important due to the potential severity of an unwanted event 
involving cruise ships in polar waters. 
6.1 Suggestions for Further Work 
Competence and experience in polar waters seem easily available (usually in-house) for 
operators well-established in the area. It would be interesting to learn how the cruise industry 
approach this. A survey, where the cruise industry responds, could give useful insight in this 
regard. 
The forthcoming expedition cruise ships with high ice class can provide a false sense of 
safety, stretching the shoulder season and pushing the operational limitations. Combined with 
poor hydrographic data in the polar area, especially in newly ice-free waters, this could lead 
to a grounding. More research regarding the probability of this should be conducted. 
The Akademik Ioffe incident (Chapter 4.6.3; Appendix C), where the “coincidental buddy-
ship” Akademik Sergey Vavilov happened to be the sister ship, was very interesting. Perhaps 
more work related to the buddy concept and standardization of the procedures and equipment 
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Questionnaire – Implementation of the Polar Code 
This questionnaire is part of a master thesis at UiT - The Arctic University of Norway. The 
purpose of the questionnaire is to gain qualitative data regarding the implementation of the 
Polar Code in the cruise industry. All answers will be anonymized when used in the thesis. 
You can choose not to answer at any time. 
The questions are mainly directed towards the cruise industry but may also be answered by 
others who are familiar with the Polar Code to provide a larger basis for discussion. 
Below each question there is a complementary text providing further description of the 
question. 
The questionnaire takes approximately 15-20 minutes to complete. 
The head supervisor for the thesis is Professor Ove Tobias Gudmestad. 
Thank you for helping me in my master thesis. 
Please contact me if there are any questions. 
Email address: bkr007@post.uit.no 
Private email: bendikskoglundkristiansen@gmail.com 
 
Sincerely, 
Bendik Skoglund Kristiansen 
Master student - Technology and Safety in the High North 














Question Additional Description 
Q1: In your experience, what are the 
challenges meeting the STCW requirements 
of the Polar Code?  
E.g.: Basic/advanced courses, in-house or 
external facilities, sea time. 
Q2: In your experience, what are the 
challenges meeting the SOLAS requirements 
of the Polar Code? 
E.g.: Stricter demands, life-saving 
appliances, economy, installation/fitting of 
new equipment. 
Q3: In your experience, what are the 
challenges meeting the MARPOL 
requirements of the Polar Code? 
E.g.: Type of fuel, alternative power 
generation (hybrid, electric, Liquified Natural 
Gas (LNG)), holding capacity of sludge, 
sewage and greywater, garbage handling. 
Q4: In your company, how is the operational 
(risk) assessment of the ship conducted? 
E.g.: In-house or external? Operating profile 
and operational limitations. Who is involved 
(crew, superintendent, fleet captain, HSEQ 
director, other high-level management)? 
Occupational or dynamic (part of voyage 
plan)? Try to describe the process. 
Q5: In your company, how is the Polar Water 
Operation Manual (PWOM) developed? 
E.g.: In-house or external? Is PWOM 
integrated in existing safety management 
system (procedures, checklists, contingency 
plans)? Are there cross references from 
PWOM and operational risk assessment? Try 
to describe the process. 
Q6: In your company, who participate in the 
development of the Polar Water Operation 
Manual (PWOM)? 
E.g.: In-house or external? Who is involved 
(crew, superintendent, fleet captain, HSEQ 
director, other high-level management)? Why 
these organizations/functions? 
Q7: Are the non-conformities and lessons 
learned from previous operations considered 
when performing the operational (risk) 
assessment or developing the Polar Water 
Operation Manual (PWOM)? 
E.g.: What kind of reporting regime is in 
place for reporting non-conformities and 
accidents? Can experience from previous 
operations be transferred to the PWOM? 
Q8: Is compliance to the Polar Code 
considered beneficial to the company? 
E.g.: Can it be used in advertising? Can it be 


































Question R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7
Q1
The challenges are to convince 
participants of STCW (polar code) 
courses that they become aware of the 
dangers that are present in remote 
area's and the limited resources to 
assist you.
Providing a good basic and advanced course is not the problem; if you 
have the correct simulators and (ice) experienced teachers you can do a lot 
in 1 week. But the effect of the courses depends of the experience of the 
participants. None of the crew of cruisevessels have (because of the low or 
no icestrengthening of their vessels) real experience in ice with their own 
ships. (The so called expedition vessels with icestrengthening is something 
else). The impact of the same courses for crew with ice strengthened 
vessels (for example Redbox with PC3 vessels) is much better. Crew on 
cruisevessels with previous ice experience on cargo vessels is already 
better.
Accumulating sufficient sea time. In order to get polarcode advanced license, two 
months of seagoing service in polar waters or equivalent as deck officer is required. 
The definition of Polar waters in a Polarcode-context is those areas where the 
polarcode applies, respectively Arctic and Antarctic pc-region. For most deck officers 
on board passenger ships, it will take years to obtain 2 months real sea time in PC 
areas, as such vessel spend only a few days per year inside those areas.
There is a requirement in advanced level that 
someone needs to have two months of seagoing 
service in management level before someone can 
get the advanced training. But you can;t sail in 
management level without an advanced certificate. 
the interpertation by flagstates varies in this matter.
Lack of relevant seatime with navigating in ice. You might getting your 
certificate without any real ice navigation done and only summer 
operation as experience.
Gaining sea time in actual ice conditions the ship will be 
potentially operating in with experienced ice navigators is 
key to developing suitable experience. A simulator can only 
provide so much even with experienced ice navigators as 
instructors. This is based on nearly 40 years of experience in 
summer and shoulder season Arctic (all areas) and southern 
Canadian winter sea ice with the Canadian Coast Guard.
Potential lack of competence to give such 
courses. More research and industry 
improvements is needed and improvments of 
STCW requirements to come.
Q2
In the polar code many things are 
suggested, it should be mandatory (e.g. 
what should be in a survival kit and 
also the quality of the equipment and 
materials) 
Emergency preparedness. Although all the vessels are complying with 
SOLAS they are not ready for a real incident. See the Sarex exercises on 
Svalbard. The goal based approach of Part 1 of the Polar Code doesn't give 
a good standard for the manufactures.
LSA. Most of today's passenger ship's LSA is not adequate for polar regions. I have 
reason to believe that less than 10 percent of ships traficking polar regions carry LSA 
that will provide the required 5 days survival for personell. In adition, relatively few 
vessels have winterization-characteristics that make them suitable for sailing in worst-
case polarconditions.
The defnitions of the code are clear. The 
interpertatin by various classification societies and 
flagstates vary. And current items under discussion 
(such as the interpertation for guidelines on life 
saving appliances in polar waters) may cause huge 
implications. 
A proper risk assessment must be the base of what equipment is needed on-
board. The outcome of his risk assessment can be questioned by different 
crew and during port state or flag-state inspections. The equipment must 
be relevant to the actual operation and this must be stated in the PWOM 
and also referred to the vessels PST. Also the requirement of 5 days 
survival can be challenged. What equipment must be carried in a summer 
vs winter operation on the same location?
An existing ship with a recognized ice class, not so difficult 
to meet based on recent experience. For a new ship there are 
many more additional equipment costs to be incurred and it 
is very easy to go overboard very quickly with winterization 
which gets very expensive, very quickly and drives other 
requirements like auxiliary generator sizing. There really has 
to be rational thinking applied to degree of application of 
winterization and this starts with selection of an appropriate 
Polar Service Temperature for the proposed area of 
operation and the operational season.
5 days survival and balance equipment and 
training.
Q3 NA
The only problems I hear is with the ballastwater treatment due to the 
seawater temperature. But this is a bigger problem for the cargovessels as 
for the cruisvessels. If you see part1 of the polar code as the "prevention 
side" the focus must be there (impossible to clean the environment in a 
remote area under Arctic conditions)
All the MARPOL requirements are uncomplicated to meet. One of the two main topics 
for the polarocode is to mitigate the impacts on the environment. A possible future 
requirement for the polarcode, may be that no ships are allowed to carry HFO or any 
other fuel-substances with potentially severe environmental impacts in case of spill. 
This will lead to challenges for larger (cruise) ships that normally uses HFO as main 
fuel in other regions.
There are to less receiving facilities, so while there 
is a restriction in the use of an oily water seperator 
for example there are no receiving facilities where 
you can discharge.
The most challenging is lack of reception facilities and that vessels not 
equipped with systems large enough to hold the waste for the duration of 
the voyage if for example you have a longer cruise. Lack of receptions 
facilities for waste and sludge and if there will be a ban of gray water as 
well. Lack of bunker facilities especially if you are trying to run you vessel 
on LNG. 
For the Canadian Arctic the main constraint is basically no 
shore infrastructure to support shipping. As well, MARPOL 
requirements are really geared toward transiting or 
destinational shipping making compliance difficult or nearly 
impossible in terms of waste holding for research and 
government vessels/icebreakers which spend longer periods 
of time in ice covered waters.
Not so much. There are good sollutions here. 
But stil large room for improvments.
Q4 NA
The Operational Assessment is mostly done by following the "templates" 
of the class (LLoyds). So you can see who is involved. Most of the time 
crew (staff) is also involved.Must be because the Polar Code is due to the 
goal based approach a sort of "mini ISM system" and crew must be 
involved to keep it realistic.
The risk assessment is conducted on board prior to each ice-related operation and 
includes all crew that one way or another will be involved in the operation. This means 
bridge officers, engine officers, deck crew and all other relevant personell. I would say 
it is both occupational and dynamic - there is a well funded and well documented risk 
assessment system that covers ice/polarcode operations in general. In adition, each 
single operation is subject for more thorough and detailed planning and preparation - a 
dynamic risk assessment to say.
We operate over 25 years in the polar regions, the 
assesment has been done by office personell and 
experienced ships staff.
The operational RA is first done by chartering department together with 
technical department, HSEQ and Crewing to see if the vessel and crew is 
fit for purpose. We have in house expertise with ice and arctic operations 
and this persons are involved early in the process as well during and in the 
followup. The vessels captain and chief engineer are also involved in an 
early stage to have comments and input on the operation and what might 
be done to prepare the vessel and crew.
We have used a combination of internal and external, ship 
and shore-based operational and engineering (shipboard, 
naval architect, mechanical and electronic) subject matter 
experts with a subject matter expert facilitator (external to 




PWOM is (again with assistance of class) part of the ISM system. And 
most of the time you can see cross references. Also to AECO etc. PWOM 
is directly based on the O.A. 
The PWOM for the specific ship is based on a company made manual for polarcode/ 
ice operations in general. Further, the PWOM is integrated in the ISM-system and is a 
fundamental product for risk asessment, voyage planning and contingency plans.
As we soley operate in Polar areas our ISM system 
already contains most information with regards to 
Polar Water operaytions, therefore our POWM is 
an addition to what already is covered in our ISM.
The PWOM was done in-house in the company with input from the 
vessels and different departments. On-board RA as well as table top RA in 
the office was conducted and implemented in the PWOM. In the process 
of developing the PWOM, several already existing procedures and 
checklists in the SMS was updated to comply with the Polar Code and the 
PWOM also refers to this ISM documents.
For new vessels external support has been utilized through 
the designer and shipyard for manual development. For 
existing vessels we will attempt in-house development using 
our own subject matter experts. The Operational Assessment 
is the basis for much of the content of the PWOM thus they 
go hand-in-hand.
NA
Q6 NA Same as with the Operational Assessment. With larger input of crew.
The PWOM is developed on board and based on experiences gained from polar 
operations / voyages over a period of several years. Officers from both deck and 
engine department has contributed in developing the manual. It is considered that the 
personell actually performing the tasks has the best base for describing and doing 
reccomendations for ice / polarcode operations. In turn, this on board-developed 
manual eventually became the framework for the fleet manual that covers non-ship-
sepcific polarcode operations.
Office personell and ships staff.
Vessel crew, superintendent, HSEQ director, chartering director and 
crewing director. The coordinating and writing was done by a teem of 
experienced ice navigating officers and projects managers that was 
working with this project during the process of develop and 
implementation and certification 
Same as the OA (to develop the manual table of contents) 
but, more shipboard personnel involved (for manual 




Should be. But especially experience in the subarctic (ice infested waters 
outside the Polar Code area) doesn't always meet the Polar Code. For 
example: Polar Code is asking for a method to assess the ice regime, most 
of the time POLARIS is used. Difficult for cruisevessels: what is safe 
speed and what is a safe distance to glacial ice (must be mentioned in 
PWOM according to POLARIS) But they are not willing to use the same 
risk assesment of glacial ice outside the polar code area (safe speed while 
in transit during the nigt to the next location /port).
See answer above.
No as our vessels were already operational in Polar 
Waters and 95% was already implemented.
Yes! After an arctic operation we have a debriefing session with the 
captain and chief engineers together with the chartering, technical and 
HSEQ department. Lessons learned are followed up to improve systems 
and procedures. As the PWOM is a document stamped by Class or flag 
state it is not that easy to update. Procedures refereed to is easier to update 
and a new RA can be added in the system
Yes, although a very small percentage of total incidents 
attributed to operations in ice. The PWOM will be auditable 
under the organizations safety management system.
NA
Q8 NA
Yes. To avoid claims. When I show pictures of cruisevessels wich are (far) 
beyond their limitations (and we calculate a Ris Index Outcome to proof it) 
they are always getting uncomfortable when I mention that 1 of the 
passengers can be a member of Greenpeace collecting evidence. 
(Greenpeace is also following Basic and Advanced courses). Port State 
Control: Negative publicity when the vessel is detained.
Yes. The introduction of the polarcode was an essential leap forward in terms of safety 
for both humans and environment, and any lack of will or ability to act in accordance 
with the code will lead to severe negative impacts for the company. Basically, there is 
absolutely no reason NOT to follow the requirements in the polarcode, whereas there 
are numberless reasons to do. Any negative attitude towards the polarcode will most 
likely end up being an organizational suicide for any cruiseship company that travels 
the polar regions.
In our market each competitor needs to comply as 
well. So there is no difference.
Yes. As we are operating or bidding on tenders that is inside the Polar 
Code area we are very much depended that we have vessels complying 
with the code. We use our Polar Code compliance in marketing as well. 
The Canadian Coast Guard is technically exempt from the 
code and any associated regulations as government vessels in 
non-commercial service. However, regulatory compliance is 
done in the spirit of the applicable codes and regulations to 
show industry that we are leading the way and face the same 





Icing stability: in chapter 4 related to intact conditions. The scenario of 
icing in combination with damage stability is not taken into account. I hear 
that for cruisevessels this scenario can be a problem. 
In my opinion there should be only one polarcode license, not two. What is the reason 
for distinguishing between basic and advanced? Regardless the rank/posistion on 
board, every (deck) officer will sooner or later have to deal with Polar conditions, and 
the training offered to officers should thus be the same. Either you are in polar waters 
or you are not. Either you are prepared and skilled or you are not. There is no such 
thing as "basic" or "advanced" polar conditions.
I would be interested in the outcome. Good luck!
Very interesting topic and it will be interesting to see how different Arctic 
states will implement and handle the inspection and how the Polar Code is 
followed by the vessels operating in the area. Some of the vessels heading 
in to arctic never call in to one of the arctic states and is only visited by 
inspectors in "warmer" countries. Is the competence there?











Fourth Joint Arctic SAR Workshop & TTX 
Scope   
The Icelandic Coast Guard (ICG), the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) North 
Norway and the Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators (AECO) have since 2016 
arranged a table top exercise (TTX), inviting cruise operators, Search and Rescue (SAR) 
responders. Academia, industry and other interested stakeholders to participate. The Canadian 
Coast Guard (CCG) was responsible for leading the TTX this year, and the 2019 TTX called 
“Stranded” painted a scenario where 66 cruise passengers were prevented from returning to 
the ship due to sea ice after a small boat excursion. The situation is then complicated by 
weather, medical issues and the need to spend the night on the shore. The theme of the TTX 
vary each year, but the main goal is to contribute to a common understanding between the 
participants regarding SAR in the Arctic. The two-day event consisted of a variety of speakers 
among the participants on day one and two, while the TTX was conducted during the last part 
of day two. Starting this year, the event falls under the ARCSAR project (Arctic and North 
Atlantic Security and Emergency Preparedness Network) as it is a forum for dialogue and 
networking between stakeholders in the Arctic corresponding to the ARCSAR objectives 
(ARCSAR, 2019). 
The speakers presented highly relevant topics. Some of the most interesting presentations 
were related to first hand experiences from recent incidents, including perspectives from 
Lufttransport related to the Northguider grounding in December 2018, One Ocean 
Expeditions sharing their experience from the Akademik Ioffe grounding in August 2018 and 
JRCC South Norway talking about the very recent Viking Sky incident in March 2019. 
Lessons Learned 2016-2018 
The main findings from previous SAR TTXs are related to communication, preparedness and 
technical improvements. 
• Communication: media handling, clear messages, correct and updated information, 
“who says what and when” 
• Preparedness: more self-reliant, acknowledge limitations, risk assessments, exercises 
• Technical improvements: fire extinguishing system, survival and rescue equipment, 
means of communication 





Different perspectives: The overall impression is that the need for this kind of forum for 
knowledge-sharing and networking is present. The different stakeholders seem to have some 
different perspectives and seem to prioritize differently on many issues. For example, the 
SAR entities want to know about an incident as early as possible – preferably before it even 
IS an incident – so they can start preparing by for example scrambling or re-positioning SAR 
units. As one of them put it: “We are professional pessimists”. Some cruise operators on the 
other hand, have both the capacity, equipment and personnel to handle many incidents 
themselves, they want to be self-reliant and may not immediately recognize the need for 
assistant rescue.  
Networking: A good example of the positive outcome of this kind of event came from One 
Ocean Expeditions during the presentation of the Akademik Ioffe incident. They specifically 
stated that their successful response to the incident was largely due to the lessons learned 
during the previous SAR TTXs. This was especially related to communication between the 
operator and the JRCC and the benefits of a solid media strategy. 
Knowledge-sharing: There were several discussions which led to new knowledge of each 
other’s capacities. For example, some operators learned about the SAR helicopters ability to 
conduct Helicopter In-Flight Refuelling (HIFR) and some of the operators were surprised to 
learn that the SAR helicopters could assist with polar bear watch using their thermal cameras, 
as stated in the press release (AECO, 2019). Also, some of the SAR entities learned that many 
of the operators have highly skilled personnel in different categories and high-tech equipment 
such as drones and remotely operated underwater vehicles. 
ARCSAR: The (brief) description of the ARCSAR project is that the ARCSAR network will 
address the Arctic and North-Atlantic (ANA) region, preparing to cope with the security and 
safety threats that will result from increased commercial activity in the region including 
traffic through the Northern passages, cruise traffic and offshore oil & gas activity. JRCC 
North Norway oversees the project, which is a 5-year EU funded project. The project consists 
of 5 extensive work packages (WPs) divided between JRCC North Norway, the University of 
Portsmouth (UP), Laurea University of Applied Sciences (LUA), JRCC Iceland and Cork 
Institute of Technology (CIT). A very interesting project, also relevant for my thesis. 
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AECO information: AECO shared some new guidelines, statistics and a little bit about what 
lies ahead. The number of cruise operators (expedition), passengers and vessels are all 
increasing, and over the next 5 years over 30 new vessels are expected. AECO also have 
several tools that can prove very helpful, for example the field staff online assessment, the 
vessel tracking and the Off-Vessel Risk Assessment Tool (O-VRAT).    
Off-Vessel Risk Assessment Tool: Checks the safety, sustainability and human aspect of an 
off-vessel activity, using existing guidelines and risk scoring systems. Still in a testing phase. 
A very good initiative which can prove to be very helpful, especially for expedition leaders. 
Academic methodology: The ARCSAR project have conducted 2 workshops (so far) 
facilitated by UP. The first workshop’s objectives were to identify target areas for 
improvement, to map current gaps and needs in technology and innovation related to 
requirements in the Polar Code, and to identify barriers and innovation related to this. The 
second workshop’s objectives were to examine and exercise methods to learn from failures 
and introduce techniques for decision analysis with emphasis on the use of advanced 
operational research techniques. The methodology proposed by Professor Ashraf Labib at UP 
(Labib, 2014) is a method used for root cause analysis to help the decision-making process. It 
involves case studies of previous incidents and disasters by using a systematic approach based 
on techniques from reliability engineering. Extremely interesting and, again, highly relevant 
for my thesis.  
Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF): Strongly related to the SAR agreement issued by the 
Arctic Council, the ACGF is an operational cooperation between the 8 Arctic countries. It 
enhances SAR cooperation by exchanging procedures, technique and experiences, 
information and conducting live exercises. A survey performed in cooperation with the 
Finnish Border Guard (FBG) as a part of the Arctic Maritime Safety Cooperation (SARC) 
project is the Arctic Search and Rescue Capabilities Survey (FBG, 2017). The intention is to 
have reference material for the ACGF and it provides a good overview of the SAR 
capabilities of the 8 Arctic countries. 
Local SAR: The CCG presented a project involving the engagement of indigenous peoples in 
the Canadian Arctic for local search and rescue. Due to the enormity of the Canadian Arctic, 
the locals can be an extreme asset if involved in the SAR infrastructure. The settlements 
scattered around the Canadian Arctic are given training and equipment for conducting minor 
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SAR missions and act as first responders. The bonus of the project is the sense of pride and 
affiliation that the locals experience, and all the local knowledge that is put into good use. 
“STRANDED” – TTX: The strategic objective of the TTX, taken from the handouts at the 
event, was for “AECO members to conduct a TTX in order to determine the challenges, 
constraints and opportunities for passengers and personnel to survive a period of time 
stranded on land away from the cruise vessel and to evaluate and execute options for self and 
assisted rescue”. 
The participants were divided into 4 groups representing different areas (US/Canada, Iceland, 
Faroe Islands and Norway), each with a mix of cruise operators, captains, RCC, expedition 
leaders and government representatives. A step by step walkthrough of the scenario, naturally 
discussing the actions taken as progressing through. 
Main takeaways from the 2019 TTX (from the author’s point of view) are: 
• Knowledge of each other’s capabilities and limitations 
• Keep the RCC in the loop – even if the emergency has yet to emerge 
• A solid media strategy can reduce much of the stress for the involved actors 
• The low temperature in the scenario did not seem to be an issue until about half way 
through – keep in mind the wind chill effect and the fact that it is cold (if we add 
fatigue, fear, low morale, hunger, lack of comfort etc, the situation is not so simple) 
• The expedition leader(s) must be able to keep up the morale and must exercise good 
practical leadership in a scenario like this – VERY important 
• There can be a huge difference between passenger groups; for example, elderly people 
with various medical dependencies vs healthy middle-aged people with outdoor 
experience 
 
As a final note, the Polar Code was not often mentioned, neither in the presentations or during 
the TTX. It can be argued that some of the activities conducted by an expedition cruise 
operator should be specified and assessed in the Polar Water Operational Manual (PWOM), 











Polar Water Operation Manual – Example 
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